



Daily Report

Sub-Saharan Africa

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1 May 1991

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NOTICE TO READERS: On 6 May 1991, the DAILY REPORT will begin phasing in new radio and television sourcelines that reflect how a station identifies itself. This change eliminates the "Domestic Service" and "Television Service" designations in favor of the station identification as broadcast. The presence of a new sourceline reflects this change in policy, rather than the establishment of a new station or network.

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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ECOWAS Announces Review of Founding Treaty

*AB2304190091 Dakar PANA in English 1715 GMT
23 Apr 91*

[Text] Lagos, 23 April (PANA)—The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is to be reviewed by a committee of eminent persons, the Community's executive secretary, Abass Bundu, announced in Lagos.

The review will involve essentially the legislative powers of the community's authority, the financing of budgets of institutions and decision-making procedures of the authority and council, Bundu said in a statement received by PANA in the Nigerian capital.

The committee, to be headed by former Nigerian President Yakubu Gowon, one of the founding father's of the Community, was constituted by Bundu. The committee includes personalities from within and outside governmental circles in the ECOWAS sub-region who have distinguished themselves in the fields of law, economics, diplomacy and customs. Also, personalities from a number of international organizations have been invited to participate in the work of the committee.

At the 13th ordinary session of the authority of heads of state and government held in Banjul in May 1990, the West African leaders decided that the treaty adopted since 1975 be reviewed in line with the dramatic changes taking place on the world scene and the need for the community to modify its own strategies. [passage indistinct]

King Opens OAU Health Ministers Conference

*MB2904190291 Mbabane Domestic Service in English
1600 GMT 29 Apr 91*

[Text] His Majesty King Mswati III has called for more practical action in improving the health status of Africans, condemning slogans without action as useless. Opening the fourth ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity conference of health ministers, the king said Africa has reached a stage whereby it can no longer hope to get total assistance from international donors. He said this is particularly so because donor funding and technical assistance are becoming scarcer as the Eastern bloc countries of Europe are now competing with Africans, as they too have economic difficulties following the demise of communism.

He urged all Africans to cooperate and support whatever useful strategies that will [two-second break in transmission] Africans should try all means to establish a partnership between rural and urban areas.

Speaking at the same occasion, the regional director for Africa in the World Health Organization, Professor Gottlieb Monekosso, praised Swaziland for its commitment to sustain the goal of health for all. He said Swaziland has also never defaulted or delayed in sending its assessed contributions to the World Health Organization.

*** Muslim Plot To Dominate Countries Alleged**

*91AF0968A Lusaka TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English
17 Feb 91 p 1*

[Text] Victory Ministries, a Kitwe-based Christian movement has claimed that a conspiracy is afoot by Muslims in Africa to wrest power in countries where they have followers by dominating the political, social and economic facets.

In Lusaka deputy secretary of the United Islamic Organisation (UIO) Mr Haroon Ghumra declined to comment on the matter because of the different facets that make up the organisation. He said the UIO was only a coordinating body for various Islamic organisations, and referred queries to chairman, Mr Yusuf Patel, who could not be reached.

Pastor Nevers Mumba, founder-leader of Victory Ministries, bases his claim on a "top secret official document," which he says was "smuggled out of an African Muslim nation. At the end of this secret document are three Arabic signatures besides the presidential seal of the country under discussion."

"The document is a disclosure of an 'Islamic conspiracy of Africa' and three of the many resolutions passed at the Islam in Africa Conference are:

- To ensure the appointment of only Muslims into strategic national and international posts of member nations.
- To eradicate in all its forms and ramifications all non-Muslim religions in member countries (such religions shall include Christianity, Ahmadiyya and other tribal modes of worship unacceptable to Muslims).

Contacted for comment Secretary of State for Defence and Security Cde Alex Shapi, warned any religious following trying to dominate the country with stern reprisals.

Central African Republic

Government Requisitions Civil Servants

AB3004201491 Bangui Domestic Service in French
1830 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Decree No. 91-122 issued by President Andre Kolingba in Bangui on 30 April; followed by finance minister decree issued in Bangui on 30 April]

[Text] Article 1: The members of the Cabinet are authorized to requisition the civil servants and government employees of their respective ministries to ensure minimum service during the period of the strike that was embarked upon on 29 April 1991.

Article 2: The present decree, which takes effect from the date of its signing, will be recorded and published in the official white paper.

Issued in Bangui on 30 April 1991.

[Signed]: Andre Kolingba.

And then, Gabriel Evariste Leboka now reads for us the order requisitioning employees of workers of the Ministry of Finance to ensure minimum service during the strike:

[Begin Leboka recording] Order requisitioning employees to ensure minimum service at their respective posts during the strike. [passage omitted]

Issued in Bangui on 30 April 1991 on behalf of the minister of finance, commerce, industry, and small and medium enterprises, who is on a mission abroad, outside, by the minister of energy, mines, geology, and water resources, [name indistinct]. [end recording]

Media Workers Issue Warning as Strike Continues

AB3004154091 Paris AFP in English 1458 GMT
30 Apr 91

[Text] Bangui, April 30 (AFP)—Many of Central African Republic's public services were paralysed on Tuesday as civil servants stayed on strike to press for payment of wage arrears due since March. Sectors affected included schools, financial services, health care and rural development.

Media unions at government-run radio and TV and the sole daily paper ELE SONGO sent Communications Minister Tony da Silva a letter warning they would strike on Wednesday and Thursday in solidarity. If pay for March and April failed to materialise within a week, they would embark on a series of rolling strikes indefinitely, they added.

For some years government pay has been at least a month late. Official sources cite lack of liquidity due to a persistent economic crisis, with the Treasury unable to supply banks with enough currency.

Latest figures show gross national product of 1.1 billion dollars with public debt at 758 billion dollars.

Gabon

* Deby Visit Highlights Bongo's Political Role

91AF0946A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Mar 91 pp 128-129

[Article by Blaise-Pascal Talla: "A Symbolic Visit"]

[Text] Rarely has a chief of state who won power other than via the polls received such a unanimous welcome in the international community. Within a period of a few weeks, his government was recognized. By all. Two African chiefs of state even traveled to Ndjamena to offer him their support. Subsequently, the first trip abroad to be made by the new strong man of Chad was awaited with interest. Idriss Deby chose Gabon, to which he paid a visit on 6 and 7 February. Those in his entourage explain that this was the choice because in the Central African subregion, in which Chad is situated, the Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, is not only the senior head of state, but is also one of those who has played, and continues to play, an important role in the African efforts to reestablish peace in Chad. Thus it was homage, above all, which Deby wanted to render to Bongo. And this takes on particular importance when one remembers that just after his working visit to Libreville, the Chadian chief of state flew to Paris, where he met with President Francois Mitterrand, and then went on to Tripoli to meet with Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

Thus in February 1991, Libreville was confirmed in its role as the diplomatic capital of Central Africa, which, it has been suspected, it had coveted discreetly for long years. It is true that the imperatives of the current situation dictated that the visit Nelson Mandela has just paid there was the most important event to occur in Gabon since the beginning of the year. But Idriss Deby's visit was no less important. It was even highly symbolic.

It was a working visit, but an eminently political one. Libreville, Paris, Tripoli. This order was certainly no accident. In Gabon, Deby went to visit an "elder" who was bound to help him to prepare for his trips to France and Libya. "President Bongo has always followed the various stages in the situation being experienced by Tchad with great interest. He is without a doubt one of those best situated to help us to achieve our goals of peace," the Chadian chief of state did not hesitate to state.

National Priorities

During his stay in Libreville, Deby had reason to be pleased with the democratic experience of his hosts, who "were willing to move in the direction of their people's desires." He has committed himself to do as much, if not more, in his country, but he would hope to be allowed to establish the priorities. "Chad cannot be immune to the winds of democracy blowing across the continent, but we must take the time required to bring about this democratization without neglecting other priorities—greater priorities."

These priorities are, naturally, security, peace, and national unity. And the former commander in chief, who has become the national leader, develops his arguments by pointing out that his country, which has over a long period of time been shaken to its foundations, cannot proceed toward a multiparty system without first binding up its wounds. "To achieve this, freedom will not suffice," he says with assurance. "Democracy with multiple parties is a given. All of the freedoms are guaranteed to the people, including the right to strike, the right of assembly, and the right to organization membership. The conversion of all of this into a multiparty system will come in its time, rather quickly, as soon as the country has reconciled with itself."

The trip to Libreville thus had a national dimension, in addition to its African and international dimensions. Also, after long talks with his host, President Deby restated his confidence in the arbitration of the World Court in the Hague, to which his predecessor and Libya have submitted the file on the Aouzou gang. While the verdict of this juridical instance is pending, Idriss Deby would like to see his country coexist peacefully with Libya, as well as with all of Chad's neighbors. "Twenty-four years of war is indeed too long," he added. He went on to express the hope that a new era of cooperation can be initiated on both sides, with mutual respect for the sovereignty of nations, but also for the territorial integrity of each country. Omar Bongo, for his part, gives assurance that within the ad hoc committee of the OAU on the reconciliation between Chad and Libya, which he has headed for some years, efforts will continue, even after the World Court verdict is handed down, on all the necessary points. The new strong man in Ndjamenà will resume the discussion on conciliation held in the Gabonese capital, both in Paris and in Tripoli, using exactly the same terms. As if to demonstrate that his arguments do not vary as circumstances change.

But the priority is national reconciliation, which will allow the sons of Chad to put all of their knowledge, their experience, and their energy to work in the service of the reconstruction of a country ruined by the dictatorship of Hissein Habre. "We are relying on all of the citizens of Chad to help us to improve the orientation of our program and to achieve the multiparty goal more quickly."

Idriss Deby also paid a visit to the acting president of the UDEAC [Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa], the leading subregional organization, which is not functioning so well at present. In this way, he reaffirmed his faith in the future of Central Africa, and he expressed the hope that this "historic body" will survive the passage of time and change. Idriss Deby will, moreover, return to Libreville in the month of April to participate "very actively" in the coming Union summit meeting. For he knows that the development of Chad depends on its integration in the economy of the subregion. Now and henceforth, President Bongo is committed not only to helping the people of Chad to reestablish an atmosphere of peace in their homeland, but

also to putting the experience of Gabon in the service of Chad's economic development.

President Bongo may also set diplomatic actions in motion in the coming months to speed up national reconciliation in Chad. It is even possible that individuals like Goukouni Weddeye will return to Ndjamenà quite soon.

Rwanda

Rebel 'Cockroaches' Attack From Uganda 30 Apr

EA3004165691 Kigali Domestic Service in French
1115 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] One month after the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan Government and Rwandan Patriotic Front representatives at N'sele, the cockroaches [inyenzi] continue to violate the agreement. This morning, coming from Uganda, they attacked the Kidaho and Butaro Communes in Ruhengeri Prefecture, as described by Jean-Baptiste Hakizimana from there:

[Begin Hakizimana recording] Today, 30 April 1991, the Rwandan Armed Forces have been fighting against the rebels [inkotanyi] since dawn in Ruhengeri Prefecture, in the Kidaho and Butaro Communes. Coming from Uganda—as has always been the case—they entered through five points, as they are numerous. The five points are: Nyagahinga, Cyanika, (Nyagatozi), Kagogo—both in Kidaho Commune and Rugendabari in Butaro Commune.

The population, which fled from their homes when they heard the gunfire, are now gathered not far from the Kidaho Commune headquarters, where they await the result of these clashes. In any case, the Rwandan Armed Forces have had the upper hand up to now and are repulsing the enemy toward Uganda, where they came from. [end recording]

Incursion 'Totally Defeated'

EA3004212591 Kigali Domestic Service in French
1800 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The rebel cockroaches [inyenzi-inkotanyi], who today once again attacked Rwanda from Uganda, were, as has always been the case, totally defeated by the Rwandan Armed Forces. Jean-Baptiste Hakizimana reports from Ruhengeri:

[Begin Hakizimana recording] As we have told you, the rebels divided themselves into five columns which were to deal with specific points, such as Nyagahinga, Cyanika, Nyagasozi, Kagogo, and Rugendabari. In all these places, they came up against fierce resistance from the Rwandan Armed Forces, which remain vigilant in this area. Out of the 700 assailants, 70 are now recorded dead.

Around 1600 [1300 GMT], the Rwandan Armed Forces were still repulsing those of the rebels who entered

through Nyagasozi, Butenga Sector. In other places where they made attempts to break through, the rebels were repulsed toward Uganda, where they had installed their arms [as heard] on the Katarara, Gahuru, and Beningeda hillocks. The population managed to identify other rebels at (Murora) and (Kabyengo), on the shores of Lake (Tshiahasi) in Uganda [as heard].

It is unfortunate that these attacks continue to hit Rwanda at a time when the military observer group in charge of supervising implementation of the 29 March N'sele cease-fire agreements continues its work in Byumba.

According to some of the local people we talked to, the rebels and the National Resistance Army of Uganda soldiers—the latter pretending to be on patrol near the Rwanda-Uganda border—were all wearing T-shirts bearing the name of the late Fred Rwigyema.

In the Butenga sector, the rebels abducted three young men, while in Cyanika, they ruthlessly massacred an old man who had remained in his house. For the time being, the Rwandan Red Cross is starting to bring assistance to the displaced people. [end recording]

Zaire

Human Rights Group: 42 Killed in Mbuji-Mayi

*AB3004093891 Paris AFP in English 0914 GMT
30 Apr 91*

[Text] Kinshasa, April 30 (AFP)—Forty-two people were killed and 28 seriously wounded when security forces opened fire on demonstrators in the diamond-mining town of Mbuji-Mayi, eastern Kasai Province, a spokesman for the Zaire Human rights League said here. Lawyer Muila Kayembe, who carried out inquiries in the town on behalf of the league, also said Mbuji-Mayi was severely damaged in the three days of disturbances on April 13, 14 and 15.

Speaking Monday night, Mr. Kayembe said 29 of the dead had been identified and another 13 bodies had reportedly been taken away by soldiers. His allegations were backed by reliable sources here. Twenty-eight people including children suffered serious gunshot wounds as soldiers repeatedly fired on demonstrators, Mr. Kayembe said. Most of the victims were hit on Monday, April 15, he said.

The government toll for the violence is nine killed by gunfire and 30 wounded with close to a million dollars'

worth of damage. Mr. Kayembe said he thought the damage far exceeded the government's figures.

Zaire's parliament has voted to send a commission of inquiry to Mbuji-Mayi to find out what happened. The results of a first parliamentary probe were rejected by the National Assembly as inadequate and untrue. An official of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) said on April 19 that there was a "massacre" after security forces prevented a party meeting. Official sources say that the Army intervened to halt looting.

Commission To Investigate Violence

*AB3004193691 Dakar PANA in English 1915 GMT
30 Apr 91*

[Text] Kinshasa, 30 April (PANA)—Zairian legislators on Monday decided to send a parliamentary commission of inquiry to the country's central town of Mbuji-Mayi where mob violence led to killings and looting two weeks ago.

The legislators took the decision after examining the report of its commission on information on the incidents which occurred on 13 April, 14 April, 15 April and 16 April in the diamond mining city where public buildings and shops were also destroyed.

The governor of the Kasai Region said nine persons died in the riots as against the figure of 12 reported by the local press.

The upheaval was said to have been sparked off by the arrest of militants of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UPDS) party, after it met and swore-in some regional officials on 13 April.

Seven New Political Parties Register

*AB2904213091 Dakar PANA in English 1826 GMT
29 Apr 91*

[Text] Kinshasa, 29 April (AZAP/PANA)—Seven new political parties have been registered by the Zairian Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, the country's television reported at the weekend.

It gave the names of the new parties as, the Rally for Social Democracy (RADESO), the Party of Ecologists (ECOLO) and the Young Democrats Party (PJD).

The others are, the Alliance of Sages for Development (ASD), the Party of Convinced Social Democrats of Zaire (PDSZ), the National Party for Economic Progress (PNPE) and the Rally of Independent Mobutists (RAMI).

Ethiopia

Rebels Wound 'About 3,000' in Beylul Offensive

EA3004164991 (Clandestine) Voice of the Broad
Masses of Eritrea in Tigrinya 0400 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The heroic people's army of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front have repulsed an enemy offensive on the Beylul front and wounded about 3,000 soldiers, dispersing the rest of them.

In the recent engagement, carried out on 27 and 28 April 1991, the enemy lost more than 800 soldiers, over 300 of which were killed and 500 wounded. Our combatants also captured 60 light and medium weapons.

The enemy opened the Beylul front offensive on 25 and 26 April 1991. In the engagement carried out on these two days, the enemy soldiers put out of action numbered 2,135. Hence the enemy has lost about 3,000 soldiers in the last week.

OLA Captures Dogo From 'Colonial' Forces

EA3004191591 (Clandestine) Voice of Oromo
Liberation in Oromo 1000 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Girawa Province, eastern Harerge, eastern Oromia—The heroic Oromo Liberation Army [OLA], armed by the Oromo Liberation Front [OLF] and fighting in eastern Oromia for the rights of the Oromo nation, has continued its victories in the offensive against the enemy. In an offensive carried out against the enemy base in the town of Dogo, the heroic OLA routed the enemy force and gained full control of the town of Dogo.

Of the enemy force based in the town, more than 30 soldiers were killed while a considerable number were wounded and six others captured. The heroic OLA captured various types of weapons and property from the enslaving Amhara colonial government forces. [passage omitted]

The OLA has distributed relief supplies to the people of the town, which were donated by the international charities for humanitarian assistance and had been stored by the enemy to feed its soldiers.

In another development, fascist Dergue government soldiers fleeing from OLA punishment in two vehicles detonated explosives planted by the OLA engineering unit between the towns of Dogo and Girawa. The two vehicles were destroyed and seven Dergue soldiers were killed and the rest wounded.

After taking control of the town, OLA briefed many thousands of residents on the current situation in the Ethiopian empire as well as on the objectives of the OLF. The fighting took place on 27 April 1991. [passage omitted]

Kenya

Moi Discusses Problems in Horn of Africa

EA3004205091 Nairobi Domestic Service
in English 1300 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] His Excellency, President Daniel arap Moi, today expressed deep concern over the enormous tragedy unfolding in the Horn of Africa and which he said could result in the worst massive famine ever. The president said that some 17 million people in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, which have been severely effected by years of civil wars and recurrent drought, are now threatened with starvation and death.

President Moi noted that at the end of the cold war, the superpowers left the countries in the Horn of Africa in severe poverty and disorganisation, a state to which their early involvement may have contributed. He pointed out that two-thirds of the population in the region live below the poverty line, adding that most of the land is marginal and the little potential it has is not fully exploited. President Moi said that the state of poverty in the region and the competition for the sparse resources may have contributed to the conflict. The involvement of external forces may also have contributed to the state of poverty.

President Moi was addressing a news conference at State House, Nairobi. The president observed that most of those who suffer as a result of natural disasters (and the wars) in the Horn of Africa are women and children. He added that half of the population in the subregion are children who have to struggle hard to survive to the age of five. He cited Ethiopia and Sudan, where he said the military expenditure exceeds that of education and health services, thus jeopardizing the future of children and obstructing development. The president lamented that in both countries there were five times as many soldiers as there are teachers.

President Moi said in 1989, half of Africa's 5 million refugees were located in the Horn, while large numbers of people were displaced and rendered destitute. He further said those who have been displaced within their own countries have had to seek refuge in Kenya and other countries, seeking survival and security.

President Moi said the problems in the Horn of Africa can no longer be ignored, as it was serious human tragedy involving loss of life, disablement, displacement, material destruction, social disintegration, and psychological suffering. He said Kenya, as a close neighbor with a long history of close ties with countries in the Horn of Africa, had a moral obligation to assist on humanitarian grounds. Noting that the crisis in the Horn of Africa was global, President Moi urged all people of goodwill to pay urgent attention and give support to curb it. He said urgent action could play a vital role in saving millions of lives.

The president called on world leaders to honor their pledges on the protection of children and their survival, to turn their attention to the Horn of Africa. He urged the international community to take note of the catastrophe now unfolding in the region and give humanitarian assistance to avoid massive numbers of deaths from famine.

President Moi at the same time called on international donor agencies to hold a conference on the Horn of Africa to assess the current situation and devise an appropriate solution. He also called on members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, IGADD, to convene a special meeting to consider the urgent humanitarian issues affecting the region.

President Moi urged all parties involved in conflicts in Africa to respect the OAU resolution of July 1990 on peace for children, which required unhindered access of relief and readmittance of workers to population areas affected by conflicts. He further urged all those involved in humanitarian assistance to conduct their activities in an impartial and transparent manner so that they can reinforce their capacity to alleviate human suffering and contribute to peace.

President Moi called for an end to the armed conflict and search for peaceful solutions to political problems in order to ensure a promising future for the children of the region. He appealed to the warring parties in Somalia and Ethiopia to cease fighting and instead seek dialogue in resolving their problems.

Tanzania

Mwinyi Holds Talks With Namibia's Nujoma

EA2304214091 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 0700 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Text] Dar es Salaam—President Ali Hassan Mwinyi yesterday evening held talks with President Sam Nujoma of Namibia, who is on an official three-day visit to the country. According to a statement issued by State House officials, the talks took place a few minutes after Mr. Nujoma, who is accompanied by his wife, mother (Kavambo), arrived in the country and rested briefly. There is no further information regarding the talks, but it is believed that the leaders discussed matters concerning the two countries, as well as international issues, including the question of the elimination of apartheid in South Africa, a country which shares a common border with Namibia.

In the evening, President Nujoma attended a state banquet hosted in his honor by his host, President Hassan Mwinyi, at State House, Dar es Salaam. At the banquet, President Mwinyi hailed President Nujoma for his efforts, which have enabled Namibia to become independent, and said the Namibian president was Africa's hero. Mr. Nujoma was also given Tanzania's highest hero prize, the Kilimanjaro Torch Symbol, First Grade.

In his speech during the banquet, President Mwinyi explained Tanzania's stand which calls on the international community to continue its economic and political sanctions against the Boer government of South Africa until they agree to bring about genuine democratic changes.

Nujoma Thanks Tanzania for Support

EA2304214491 Zanzibar Domestic Service in Swahili 1600 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Text] Zanzibar—President Sam Nujoma of Namibia has expressed heartfelt thanks to the people of Tanzania for the assistance extended to their brothers in Namibia while they were fighting against the oppressive administration of the South African Boers. He said that despite the problems facing Tanzania, the people of Tanzania had warmly welcomed their Namibian brothers and shared what little they had—a gesture that facilitated the acceleration of the Namibian liberation struggle.

Comrade Nujoma expressed these thanks today while addressing a rally at Amani stadium, which was attended by various party and government leaders as well as thousands of people.

He said that apart from directly assisting Namibia, Tanzania had also helped in the liberation struggle in all the states of southern Africa. This had contributed substantially to the liberation struggle in these states. The Namibian president cited Tanzania's assistance to Zambia in the construction of the Tazara railway and the oil pipeline from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in Zambia. He said this assistance by the people of Tanzania exemplified their genuine cooperation and unity, and that without such help, the liberation struggle in southern Africa would have been adversely affected.

President Nujoma also hailed the 1964 Zanzibar revolution and the merger of Zanzibar and Tanganyika that culminated in the emergence of Tanzania.

CCM, SWAPO Urge African Unity

EA2404120291 Dar es Salaam Domestic Service in Swahili 1700 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Text] Dar es Salaam—The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM, Revolutionary Party] and the Namibian liberation movement, South-West African People's Organization [SWAPO], have urged African states to unite in order to speed up economic progress in Africa. By hastening economic progress, the two parties said, African countries would avert the threat of being ruled afresh by the imperialists.

The parties made the call today in Dar es Salaam during joint talks between Namibian President Sam Nujoma's delegation, currently visiting Tanzania, and the Central Committee of the CCM National Executive Committee.

The CCM and SWAPO cautioned that African countries and the developing countries in general were threatened

by neocolonialism if they did not take immediate steps to initiate self-reliance. To strengthen self-reliance, SWAPO's president has called on African states to sign an accord to set up an African economic community during the forthcoming OAU summit meeting to be held in Abuja, Nigeria, next June.

President Nujoma asked Tanzania and Namibia to sign an economic and technical agreement aimed at promoting the existing relations between the two countries. He also called on the CCM and SWAPO to accelerate the cooperation and solidarity that was initiated during the Namibian liberation struggle, adding that SWAPO, which would be turned into a political party later this year, would strive to learn from CCM's experience.

President Mwinyi, for his part, assured President Sam Nujoma that Tanzania would extend technical assistance and training to Namibia. President Mwinyi told the SWAPO delegation that Tanzania had been waging an economic war to improve its economy. He said that as a result of this struggle, Tanzania had managed to increase its gross national income from 0.6 percent in 1985 to 4.1 percent in 1990.

Nujoma Condemns West's 'Maneuvers'

*EA2704113591 Zanzibar Domestic Service
in Swahili 1600 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] Zanzibar—Namibia and Tanzania are expected to sign a trade promotion accord between the two countries. This was said by Namibia's president, Mr. Sam Nujoma, during an interview conducted by the Zanzibar television service at Bwawani Hotel in Zanzibar. President Nujoma, who has ended a one-day visit to Zanzibar, said that Tanzania had many significant sectors from which Namibia could learn in an effort to promote relations between the two states.

Speaking on the conflict between the African National Congress and Inkatha in South Africa, the Namibian leader said that the two parties have now agreed to resolve their differences and harness their efforts toward the struggle for majority African rule in South Africa. He said the leaders of the two parties had recently met and

reached agreement on a number of issues, including that of settling their conflicts, which have caused the death of many African nationals.

Regarding cooperation within the South African Development Coordination Conference, Mr. Nujoma said the organization had succeeded in uniting the countries economically and expressed his hope that it would be able to unite all African countries economically. He strongly condemned, however, maneuvers by those Western countries which were governing African countries by siphoning assets from these countries for the benefit of their countries.

President Nujoma and his delegation left Zanzibar this morning for Dar es Salaam to continue his three-day visit to Tanzania.

Nujoma Signs Cooperation Accord

*EA2704114491 Zanzibar Domestic Service
in Swahili 1000 GMT 25 Apr 91*

[Text] Dar es Salaam—President Sam Nujoma left for Namibia today following a three-day visit. Prior to his departure, President Nujoma signed an agreement for setting up a joint Tanzania-Namibia commission. According to a State House spokesman, the commission will be concerned with cooperation in the economic, trade, scientific, cultural, and technical sectors.

At a news conference before leaving for the airport, President Nujoma expressed his resolve to promote cooperation with Tanzania and emulate some development programs, especially in the policy toward food self-sufficiency. Mr. Nujoma also said that the South-West African People's Organization was preparing to effect changes to make it a political party with a view to building the country's economy.

At the news conference, President Mwinyi commended the people of Namibia on their efforts during the independence struggle and urged them to maintain peace and harmony with a view to developing economically.

At the Dar es Salaam airport, President Nujoma was presented with the highest award, the Kilimanjaro Torch, which is given to leaders with unique qualities.

Sandinist Influence in ANC Strategy Noted

MB3004122191 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 30 Apr 91 p 14

[Article by Simon Barber in Washington: "The ANC's Strategy Smacks of Strong Sandinista Influence"]

[Text] In May 1977, as it prepared for the final offensive that would enable it to seize power from the justly hated President Anastasio Somoza two years later, the National Directorate of Nicaragua's Sandinista Front (the FSLN) drew up a document entitled the General Political/Military Platform for the Triumph of the Sandinista Popular Revolution.

The principal author was Humberto Ortega, leader of the FSLN's hardline, if somewhat unorthodox, Marxist faction, the Terceristas, then viewed as proponents of a benignly nationalist "third" alternative to capitalism and communism.

The platform, as summarised in David Nolan's FSLN—the Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Nolan is currently a U.S. foreign service officer stationed in Namibia), issued the following directives to Sandinista cadres:

- Develop a "minimum programme" of government calling for political pluralism, a mixed economy and international non-alignment in order to attract broad support for action against Somoza;
- Build up "intermediate mass organisations" around "day-to-day" issues on the basis, where necessary, of the minimum programme but all the while ensuring FSLN control. Pre-empt organisational efforts by other groups, especially those on the left;
- In the same vein, create a "broad anti-Somoza front", using the minimum programme to attract "bourgeois/democratic opposition groups" but taking care to preserve "FSLN hegemony";
- Unify the tendencies of the FSLN into a single ideologically pure vanguard;
- Mobilise for insurrection "through agitation in the mass organisations, radicalisation of the broad opposition front and exemplary military actions" of the FSLN. Get ordinary citizens "involved in the direct liquidation of agents of the regime";
- Undermine the integrity of the National Guard, the state's main security force, "while avoiding organisational defections or coups that might defuse the struggle by removing Somoza prematurely"; and
- Construct a strong Sandinista army "with a developed structure and national coordination: ability capable for fielding mobile forces in both rural and urban environments".

Use this "to protect the mass organisations, back up popular uprisings...and guarantee FSLN control of a

post-war government". Engage in a policy of "active accumulation of forces" to gain "combat experience, recruits, supplies and propaganda points".

The phrase "minimum programme", with its connotations of deliberate deceit, are beginning to turn up quite regularly in the context of ANC [African National Congress]/SACP [South African Communist Party] front-building.

ANC publicity director Pallo Jordan used it in Harare two weeks ago to describe how the movement was attempting to draw the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress] into a patriotic front.

December's MAYIBUYE [come back Africa], in an article describing how the ANC proposed to "consolidate its mass base" by attracting everyone from Azapo [Azanian People's Organization] to Jeugkrug [youth power] into the fold, argues for "a common minimum platform".

Advance to National Democracy addresses at length the need to co-opt and strengthen "independent, democratic mass formations" as well as organisations representing "cultural workers, the intelligentsia, the business community and others".

The anti-apartheid front, the article urges, must recruit anyone who "can enter into even limited agreements [with] the ANC" so long as care is taken to ensure that the "principle and structured alliance" of the ANC, SACP and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions], Venda, Ciskei] remains in control.

To judge by the reception accorded the ANC's latest constitutional proposals, the strategy is succeeding. Hailed as evidence that the ANC is shifting towards liberal democracy, the discussion paper is a piece of classic deception.

If the ANC's electoral system were adopted, South Africans would be voting not for individuals whom they would have a chance to evaluate at first hand, but for lists drawn up by each contending party.

In the ANC's case, the list would all too easily be controlled by SA's own Terceristas, seductive moderates all, until unwittingly placed in power by a blind electorate.

Can anyone dispute that "organisational efforts" of others are not being vigorously "pre-empted"? Last year, the ANC's NEC [National Executive Committee] faxed branch offices instructions for the Peace and Democracy Now Campaign scheduled to kick off with mass demonstrations on December 6.

Organisations under the ANC umbrella were to be encouraged to carry placards identifying themselves as such in order to show the ANC's broad appeal.

Woe betide recalcitrants, however. "The strength of the ANC on the ground must be felt and feared."

As for directives five and six in the FSLN's platform, the ANC/SACP's efforts to "liquidate agents of the regime" proceed apace, especially with reference to town councillors.

The alliance's mass mobilisation strategy has been well documented by the SAIRR [South African Institute of Race Relations].

The institute has also demonstrated the movement's exploitation of violence—much of which is itself the product of mass mobilisation—to "radicalise the broad opposition front" and "undermine the integrity" of the security forces.

The ANC/SACP self-defence unit plan might as well have been taken straight from the FSLN directive requiring construction of "a strong Sandinista army" to "protect mass organisations" and "back up popular uprisings".

The primer *For the Sake of Our Lives* is transparently designed to achieve an "active accumulation" of revolutionary forces to supplement MK [Umkhonto we Sizwe—ANC military wing]. The purpose can hardly be other than to enforce the ANC/SACP will and thus, to adapt the platform slightly, help "guarantee ANC control of a post-apartheid government". The platform worked.

There is another element of the Sandinista programme, that bears mention, for it may help explain why the ANC/SACP is trying so hard to keep sanctions in place.

Two months after Somoza was toppled, the FSLN inner circle held a secret meeting whose conclusions were distributed to cadres in what would become known as the "72-hour document".

It makes clear that one of the Sandinistas' chief concerns was that their revolution might yet be derailed by the conditional nature of foreign investment and loans, both private and IMF.

The 72-hour document specifically warns against "promoting...the thought of the indispensable need for the 'takeoff' of the reconstruction to be based on heavy foreign indebtedness".

IMF support is strenuously to be avoided because it "means shackling our economy to all the extortionist policies of imperialism".

Western capital, "joint investments", even "technology and supplies" are to be shunned where possible, and if not, tightly controlled and channelled toward specific development priorities targeted by the state.

New Nicaragua's economy—under "comprehensive national planning whose hub must be the state sector"—should rather seek to become as autarkic as possible while seeking to move away from raw material production to labour-intensive beneficiation and manufacture.

This should be familiar to anyone who has witnessed Perm [Permanent Building Society] MD [managing director] Bob Tucker's current dog and pony show,

perused the Path to Power or studied the ANC's latest economic discussion document.

Could it be that the ANC/SACP likes sanctions not only as a "pillar of people's war" but because they will free it to impose its own economic order once in power?

ANC Lawyers Devising New Constitution

MB3004112591 Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY
in English 30 Apr 91 p 15

[Report by Patrick Bulger: "High-Powered ANC Legal Team Grapples With Constitution"]

[Text] A group of high-powered constitutional and political lawyers make up the ANC [African National Congress] team devising a new constitution for a future SA [South Africa]. The team is headed by the ANC's constitutional chairman Zola Skweyiya.

It includes two of the country's most high-profile political lawyers—Arthur Chaskalson and George Bizos. Both men defended ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela at his treason trial and have kept close contact with him since. Both have a long record of defending accused in political trials.

Chaskalson was involved in helping draft the Constitution for post-independence Namibia—a constitution that has been hailed as a vehicle for reconciliation in a previously deeply divided society.

Bizos is defending Winnie Mandela on kidnap and assault charges.

Another of the advocates, Dullar Omar, has been involved with the Mandelas for decades.

Two other important contributors are Albie Sachs and Kadar Asmal. Sachs, who lost an arm in a car bomb blast in Maputo while in exile, is considered an innovative thinker on the ANC's constitutional team and has written extensively on a Bill of Rights and second generation rights in a constitution.

Second generation rights have been a cause of controversy because by implication they give the state a central role in any constitutional system.

A second generation right, for example, may give somebody a constitutionally entrenched right to a job or to a house, rather than the first generation right of perhaps being able to live where one wants and take up employment of one's choosing.

Guaranteeing a job to a citizen by definition entails the intervention of the state to secure that job which critics argue elevates the state above the individual.

Asmal is an exile lecturing in law at Trinity College, Dublin. He is a keen exponent of the principle of proportional representation in any future SA constitution.

While the constitutional team reflects ANC thinking in its disavowal of a federal system of government, it has made concessions in the form of proportional representation and devolution of power.

The ANC argues that a federal system would dilute the power of central government leaving it impotent to the tasks of reconstruction it deems so vital.

A number of attorneys who became well known in the course of anti-apartheid politics include Pius Langa, Louis Skweyiya, Mbali Mncadi, Fink Haysom, Bulelani Ngcuka and Essa Moosa.

Three top-level figures from the ANC's legal department appear on the committee and would contribute valuable day-to-day advice on constitutional thinking from within the movement. They are Bridget Mabandla, Penuell Maduna and Matthew Phosa.

Maduna and Phosa have served on ANC-government working groups on the armed struggle and prisoners.

A number of representatives are still outside the country. They include the ANC's EC representative Pat Tekane, London representatives Tony O'Dowd and Nathanile Masemula.

'Precautionary' Deployment After Lesotho Coup

MB3004152491 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1500 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] South African troops have been deployed in the Ladybrand area as a precautionary measure to counter any security threat in the wake of events in Lesotho. The minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Pik Botha, said in a statement in Cape Town that there was no threat at present.

An earnest appeal has been made to all interested parties in Lesotho to prevent armed conflict and bloodletting. Mr. Botha said it was not possible at this stage to say in what way future relations between South Africa and Lesotho would be affected. He said it would be a sharp blow for Lesotho if the Lesotho highlands water project was threatened.

De Klerk on Indemnity for Political Prisoners

MB3004173991 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1656 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Parliament April 30 SAPA—Altogether a total of 933 political prisoners had been, or were in the process of being released, the state president, Mr F.W. de Klerk, said on Tuesday [30 April].

Speaking during debate on his budget vote, he said 862 of these had already been freed by the use of his powers since February 2 last year.

He had rejected the release of 364 because the nature of their crimes was too serious, a large proportion committed against women and elderly people. One of the

cases, for example, dealt with an applicant who had raped two women, aged 94 and 87—he murdered one of them and stole a radio and jewellery.

President de Klerk said there had been an expectation that all political prisoners should have been released by Tuesday (today—April 30), but both the Pretoria and Groote Schuur Minutes had given recognition to the fact that no objective definition of political prisoners existed.

In certain exceptional circumstances, such serious crimes as murders could also be taken into consideration. The broadest possible definition had been reached.

The total number of applications for indemnity and release in April, excluding those today, was 1,823 compared with the 725 in March. On Monday 351 application had been received.

These figures showed it was not the government that was dragging its feet on the releases, but those who had been slow in applying.

A general amnesty had been granted to all prisoners who had not had the advantage of release in terms of the Pretoria Minute.

So far 4,530 of the 5,872 applications for indemnity received had already been processed—of which 55 had been dealt with individually and 90 refused or were being considered by indemnity committees.

"A further approximately 526 applications could have been dealt with by last Friday had the ANC [African National Congress] kept its appointment with officials at the Department of Justice.

"Another 402 have been referred back to the ANC for proper information and can, with their cooperation, be dealt with."

This left 287 applications which had to be dealt with individually and which were awaiting information from the responsible organisations.

The lack of cooperation and information "from the organisations involved" in the release and indemnity programme was "not satisfactory" as was the ANC's failure to be available on Monday to discuss the outstanding indemnity applications.

"Despite repeated requests to the ANC to identify those whom they claim to be political prisoners, it was only on April 25 that they, for the first time, identified themselves with a list of names that was provided by the Human Rights Commission.

"Many of the 1,292 people included in this list are simply reflected as 'unknown', or in 133 cases are imprisoned in neighbouring states. "Only 770 are on our records at all."

Mr de Klerk said it had been conveniently forgotten that the ANC had not carried out its commitment under

paragraph 3 of the Pretoria Minute until February 12, at the D.F. Malan [Airport] summit.

This meant the indemnity programme could only begin on February 12 when the ANC committed itself to carrying out the terms of the Pretoria Minute.

There were still matters from the D.F. Malan Airport meeting that had not been dealt with by the ANC regarding the termination of violent activities such as the armed struggle and the training of Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation—ANC military wing] cadres.

"A further problem which has emerged has been the ANC's latest position on self-defence units. The government will not simply accept such pronouncements."

State's Calm on 30 Apr Deadline Called 'Odd'

MB3004102791 Johannesburg THE STAR in English
30 Apr 91 p 14

[Article by Shaun Johnson: "'D-Day'" and No Sign of Panic"]

[Text] Today marks the long-awaited arrival of the first of two "deadlines" which could, if applied literally, disembowel the negotiations process by removing one of its vital organs—the enthusiastic participation of the ANC [African National Congress].

Since the signing in August last year of the Pretoria Minute, April 30 1991 has been held up as the day on which the success or failure of that landmark agreement would be judged. When things have (frequently) gone wrong between the Government and the ANC in the course of the last nine months, deadlocks and impasses have been dismissed with the answer: "It will all be sorted out by April 30." Today this rings hollow.

On subjective grounds, it is difficult to declare the performance of the Minute in the intervening months as anything but abject: Trust between ANC and Government is at its lowest ebb, there is deep-seated disagreement over what progress has been made on amnesty and indemnity and, worst of all, an even more serious deadline looms barely a week after the passing of this one.

The ANC accuses the Government of foot-dragging and obstructionism on the questions of prisoners and exiles—this notwithstanding an eleventh-hour concession from Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee on the categories of people eligible for indemnity from prosecution—and the immediate run up to today's deadline has seen a marked hardening of attitudes in statements from heavy-weights like Deputy President Nelson Mandela, Secretary General Alfred Nzo and MK [Spear the Nation; ANC military wing] Chief of Staff Chris Hani, among others.

There has been considerable objective progress since August 1990 on the exiles/prisoners question, but the prevailing atmosphere makes it almost unthinkable that either side will interpret the current situation generously.

Rather, it seems that the ANC will declare the Government efforts to be too little too late, and the Government will in turn blame the ANC for failing to cooperate fully in the process of indemnification and amnesty, as part of an overall tactic of filibustering.

All of this suggests that alarm bells should be ringing long and loud in the offices of a Government which appears to have staked no less than its political future on the continuation of the negotiating process. That they were not, only hours before the arrival of the deadline, is one of the more curious phenomena in a political system where the unexpected has become the norm.

National Party figures, from lowly caucus members to high-powered negotiators, are calm—even seemingly unconcerned. THE STAR was told repeatedly that the Government expected the ANC to "kick up some dust" today, but this should not be taken too seriously—the peace process itself was not in danger.

As recently as last week State President F.W. de Klerk spoke confidently of a political settlement on schedule—meaning before the expiry of the lifetime of the current Parliament in 1994—and his chief strategist, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, repeated his belief in the "inevitability" of the negotiations process.

There was no other way for either party, he said, implying that what might appear to the public outside as fights to the death were in fact political spats within severely proscribed parameters.

Speaking at the opening of the KwaNdebele Legislative Assembly on April 19, Deputy Constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer expanded on the theme. "The Government is anxious for a multi-party conference to get off the ground, so that a joint dedication to a peaceful solution can arise," he said, "not only to end the conflict, but also for the effective constitutional management of our country.

"There are really no more essential or credible objections or obstacles in the way of negotiation. The process must be activated as soon as possible.

"We have irreversibly entered the phase of political and economic debate and negotiation. Negotiation. Negotiation is the only solution—we cannot evade it ... the very fact that there are ultimatums, demands and threats, that violence increases alarmingly and unacceptably, emphasises the necessity of negotiation.

"If we depart from the road of negotiation, we shall in the end only have to return to this road ... thus there is no workable alternative to negotiation for any party."

This refrain (admittedly coupled with the caveat that the process "might not be easy"), is being repeated at every level within the NP [National Party], and is responsible for the odd air of calm surrounding today's "deadline."

One source told THE STAR that Government "had understanding" for the pressures under which Mr. Mandela was operating.

It was intimated that while the Government would prefer him to adopt a more conciliatory tone, it was believed that this would be forthcoming after the ANC's July conference.

"But, he added: "We seriously believe that he and the ANC NEC [National Executive Committee] remain committed to promoting a peaceful outcome."

Interestingly, Government sources now give more credence to the ANC's stated reason for its current, uncompromising stance (concern about township violence), than before. "We don't necessarily doubt their sincerity," said one, "we just think they've got about it in a stupid way."

Senior NP members hinted that this approach had been communicated to the party's more junior ranks, where some MPs [members of parliament]—those who do not have direct access to the negotiations process—were becoming jittery about the ANC's hostility. They note with concern, however, that the business sector was "not as easy to reassure."

Nevertheless, there is an overarching belief that today will pass without disastrous consequences, and that the behind-the-scenes negotiating forums will continue their work.

Government figures concede that the ANC's May 9 "ultimatum" might prove more difficult, although they insist that it too is surmountable. There is a recognition—apparently reinforced by the tendency of ANC spokesmen in recent weeks to downplay the April deadline and emphasise that of May—that damage limitation then will not be as easy.

Government sources are encouraged by the apparent down-grading of the specific demand for the resignation of Ministers Malan and Vlok, and believe that a "renewal of our undertaking" to deal with the causes of violence should be sufficient to ensure that the peace process proceeds, even if unsteadily.

According to one source: "We sense that they (the ANC) are also saying 'look beyond the specific' demands. Long-term peace is the issue.' That leaves some room for manoeuvre."

The rarefied gloss which the Government is placing on a situation which looks disastrous to the outsider remains baffling, these reassurances notwithstanding. If the NP has decided to erect a facade to disguise real concern, it is a very effective one indeed. But if, as an intrigued opposition politician suggested this week, the confidence is genuinely felt, then "perhaps they know something we don't."

30 Apr Press Review on Current Issues, Problems MB3004115191

[Editorial Report]

THE STAR

Image of Security Forces Deteriorates 'Fast'—"The government of President de Klerk seems quite unable to grasp that the image of the security forces in the townships is deteriorating so fast that soon it may be impossible to maintain any order at all," warns Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 30 April in a page 14 editorial. African National Congress, ANC, "anxiety" over violence was behind the "ill-considered 'ultimatum' earlier this month. Now, making matters much worse, the allegations of a third force have resurfaced with greater vigour and the ANC has revealed what it claims to be an assassination plot. The atmosphere is feverish." Yet the security forces, and the respective cabinet ministers, "remain hugely satisfied with the instant self-exonerations and internal inquiries, invariably favourable. They hardly seem to notice that, on those rare occasions when a judge has become involved, blame in varying degrees has been laid at their door." "One thing is clear: the ability of the security forces to maintain order is being daily undermined."

BUSINESS DAY

Intelligence Willingness To Carry Out Functions Questioned—Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 30 April in a page 14 editorial states: "In the past police have proved quite adept at acquiring information about threats of violence. That we had to be warned by the ANC is troubling. Is it possible that our state intelligence networks are either unable or unwilling to carry out their functions? The political consequences could be devastating."

SOWETAN

Government, Inkatha Gain Nothing From Violence—"It seems clear enough that the police are unable to control the violence when it bursts loose," claims the page 8 editorial in Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 30 April. "But while it seems clear enough that the police are tying themselves into all sorts of knots under present conditions, there is no reason to believe that President F W de Klerk's party gains anything from the violence." Even Inkatha "is not gaining much from being implicated in the violence. The fact that its members are accused of killing so many people is causing the party a serious loss of credibility inside and outside South Africa. That being the case, the people of South Africa should do everything possible to halt this madness."

CAPE TIMES

Colored Land Owners Right To Local Municipal Representation—Cape Town CAPE TIMES in English on 25 April in a page 6 editorial says the government "may claim to have removed one of the last vestiges of statutory apartheid with the scrapping of the Group

Areas Act, but it is copping out of the logical consequence of such action. That consequence is that people of colour who buy and occupy property in hitherto white areas should have the same rights of representation on local municipalities as their white neighbours." "There would be only one valid reason for temporarily denying a municipal vote to property owners of colour—that would be on the basis of their exemption from rates. But they will pay like anybody else. If municipal taxation for them does not first require negotiation, why should representation?"

BEELD

Repeal of University Quota Stipulation Law Welcome—"With the forthcoming repeal of the last legislative stipulation whereby the government can determine the numbers of colored students at universities—the quota stipulation—two birds are killed with one stone," states a page 14 editorial in Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 25 April. "First, it is of symbolic value that by repealing that stipulation another apartheid measure is being abolished. Second, universities now have full autonomy to determine whom they want to admit."

Government Keeps To Political Prisoners' Release Promise—Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans on 26 April in a page 12 editorial does not believe the government "dragged its feet" on the issue of releasing political prisoners. It says the government received "little help identifying political prisoners." Political groups such as the ANC were invited to compile lists of people whom they felt should be released. "Such lists were never produced," and the authorities had to "jump in...and ultimately the government's list was accepted by the ANC. But still, here and abroad, it is loudly alleged that large numbers of people are still behind bars." Justice Minister Kobie Coetzee's announcement of a further category of political prisoners to be released "proves the government is keeping to its promises. The ANC's insinuations should be judged against this."

DIE BURGER

Hani Miscalculates U.S. Support for ANC Communist Connection—"If it was Mr. Chris Hani's intention to win support during his present visit to the United States for the ANC—and specifically for the ANC's communist connection—he has made a thorough miscalculation," declares a page 16 editorial in in Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 25 April. "Informed Americans ask how Mr. Hani can still plead for an ideology that has collapsed. And even worse, how can he and his party associates dream to want to apply something like that in South Africa?" Mr. Hani should "get the message that America will only help a future South Africa where democracy reigns and where free market principles are applied. Like Rip van Winkel, Mr. Hani should be awakened from his sleep."

VRYE WEEKBLAD

De Klerk's 'Honest Intentions' Doubted—Editor Max du Preez asks in the "Friday Morning" column on pages 2 and 3 of Johannesburg VRYE WEEKBLAD for 26 April-2

May: "Is the strange inability of the otherwise highly efficient security forces to stop the violence not perhaps an indication the government believes it is in its interest to destabilize and demoralize the black communities?" Du Preez believes that if a one-man one-vote election takes place in two year's time and the National Party and its allies approach the "traumatized communities" and urge their votes in return for "peace and prosperity while the ANC only offers blood and chaos," such an appeal may find "fertile breeding ground?" "After two years of continued violence the ANC will in any case be so undermined and demoralized that it will be easily manipulated. Or am I now completely cynical?" Du Preez is "no longer convinced of F.W. de Klerk's 'integrity' and 'honest intentions'." It is becoming clearer that his "New South Africa" is "a new strategy rather than a turning point in his thinking. We must keep an eye on him."

* White Views on Nonracial Constitution Examined

91AF0960B Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL
in English 4 Apr 91 p 16

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] South Africa's top political pollsters are divided on whether whites would vote in favor of a non-racial constitution if a referendum were held today.

All agree, however, that State President F.W. de Klerk can tip the balance if he times it right and is able to provide whites with the assurance that their lifestyles will be protected.

Leading Potchefstroom University political statistician Donald Simpson believes there would be a 'yes' vote among whites of about 55 percent.

"But to achieve this," he notes, "the constitution would have to offer effective guarantees for white living standards.

"From 1993 onwards, things would not look good for a 'yes' vote, based on present projections on white voting patterns."

Simpson says recent polls suggest that support for the Conservative Party is around the 42 percent mark in the white community.

He notes that results from the Randburg, Umlazi and Maitland by-elections suggest that conservative English National Party voters are quicker to swing to the CP [Conservative Party] than conservative Afrikaans NP [National Party] voters, and that the CP is hindered by the reactionary image of the Treurnicht leadership.

Figures cited by Simpson show a swing of at least 10.6 percent from the Democratic Party [DP]/NP to the CP between the 1989 general elections and the 1990 Randburg by-election, 36.6 percent in the Umlazi by-election and 30.6 percent in the 1991 Maitland by-election.

Professor Laurie Schlemmer, director of the Center for Policy Studies at Wits University, believes that if a

referendum were held today De Klerk would be in danger of losing, but that he will win a year or so down the line.

"From recent by-election results, support for the CP appears to be between the 35 and 40 percent mark—up from the 31 percent they got in the general election. But what one gets from surveys and other indicators is that the level of anxiety among whites about future prospects exceeds the level of support for the CP.

"If a referendum were held cold, I think De Klerk would lose narrowly—a 50 to 53 percent no vote. But there is no way he will hold a referendum before some form of social contract is reached with the majority parties.

"He will wait to deliver economic growth, the end of sanctions and a couple of rugby tours, and the referendum will be held on the broad principles arising out of negotiations. The timing will be such that he probably wins it."

Schlemmer said that in a non-racial election, following the referendum, the NP would win 30 to 35 percent of the vote, the African National Congress [ANC] 35 to 40 percent and the DP seven to eight percent. CP support would fall to between 20 and 25 percent of the total white vote (under four percent of the total vote).

University of Cape Town political statistician Dr Jannie Hofmeyr believes that if a referendum were held today the vote would be 65 to 35 percent in favor of a new constitution.

"But this would depend on the referendum question being framed in such a way that there would be an unequivocal 'yes' vote from DP supporters or those holding similar sentiments."

Hofmeyr believes that in the run-up to a referendum the government would probably go out of its way to reassure whites that their living standards will be protected.

"This in turn might put severe strains on the broader negotiating process. It's the approach they'll probably take, although I think they could win it without doing this, and by saying 'face the future with courage'."

Hofmeyr's opinion is backed up by a national telephonic poll of white adults by the Gallup subsidiary, Markinor, conducted four months ago with a sample of 850.

Asked "which one party/group or organization's policy comes closest to the way you personally feel?", responses, in percentages, were as follows: NP:51.1; CP:18.4; DP/PFP [Progressive Federal Party]:8.5; ANC:1.2; HNP [Reformed National Party]: 0.4; Inkatha/Natal Indaba: 0.2; other: 1.0; none/no opinion/don't know: 19.4.

Markinor's poll of black urban opinion (excluding the homelands), conducted at the same time with a sample of 1,500, showed a very different response to the same question: ANC:65.5; NP:5.6; UDF [United Democratic Front]/MDM [Mass democratic movement]/Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions]: 1.9; Inkatha: 1.6;

PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress]: 1.6; DP: 1.1; SACP [South African Communist Party]: 0.3; Azapo [Azanian People's Organization]: 0.1; other: 0.2; don't know/none: 22.1.

Another poll of white political opinion was conducted by Mark en Meningsopnames and published in Rapport late last year.

It showed NP support had grown from 47.3 percent to 50 percent between June 1989 and September 1990, while the CP's had fallen from 28.7 percent to 25.5 percent and the DP's from 18.1 to 13.5 percent. Herstigte Nasionale Party support increased from 1.1 to 1.3 percent, and 8.6 percent of the 1,800 respondents said they would not vote compared with 3.9 percent in 1989.

However, in the past, polls by Mark en Meningsopnames and other organizations have consistently underestimated CP support, when compared with election and by-election results.

* Metal Unions Wage Negotiations Continue

91AF0960A Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS in English* 28 Mar 91 p 7

[Text] Wage negotiations in the South African metal industry are expected to have reached the formal bargaining process stage.

A preliminary meeting, held in Germiston on March 15 and attended by 200 employer and trade union leaders, reported that "good progress" had been made.

Representatives of the industry's 12 trade unions presented more than 30 individual demands for changes to the industry's main agreement, which determines the wages and conditions of employment of the industry's 360,000 employees.

These included wage increase demands ranging from 16 to 167 percent, demands to reduce the work week from 44 to 40 hours without loss of pay and a number of demands relating to training and security of employment.

The employers presented six proposals for changes to the agreement and called for trade union restraint in view of the poor economic conditions prevailing in the industry.

The employer spokesperson Brian Angus, executive director of Seifsa [Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa], highlighted the "alarming" number of retrenchments taking place in industry, now averaging 2,100 a month.

He also pointed out that employers were hard-pressed to cope with the escalating cost of labor and low levels of productivity and that South African products were becoming increasingly uncompetitive in the international markets.

Most of the registered metal industries trade unions have now submitted their demands for amendments to the main agreement.

Demands for wage increases alone range from 16 percent to 167 percent.

Despite attempts to limit the number of union demands, 30 core demands have so far been tabled.

These include the workweek to be reduced from 44 to 40 hours without loss of pay; increased leave bonus; better leave conditions; shift and subsistence allowance; minimum of four weeks' severance pay for each year of service; artisan tools to be supplied by the employer; 20 days paid childcare leave a year for all employees and March 21 to be a paid holiday.

For the third successive year employers have made proposals for changes to the main agreement.

These include the first two days' sick leave to be unpaid if a survey currently being undertaken reveals that employees are abusing sick leave arrangements; workers employed in different job categories to be paid at the higher job rate only for hours so worked; extending the limit on maximum permissible overtime which may be worked from 10 hours a week to 60 hours in any four-week cycle for non-site work and 80 hours for site work with a maximum of 20 hours a week; unauthorized absences to be penalized by allowing the employer to deduct an additional shift for leave pay and bonus qualification purposes and employees dismissed for misconduct and re-employed by the same employer within 30 days should not be regarded as having been continuously employed.

Collective bargaining in the metal industries, how it works and the poor economic prospects for 1991 have been laid out by the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation (Seifsa), an employer body.

The negotiating forum is the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industries, which was formed in 1944 by employer organizations and trade unions, of their own free will. It is not a government body.

It allows for self-government in industry by means of collective bargaining and enables employers and employees to control their own industrial relation affairs.

Employer and employee representatives on the council are chosen in equal numbers and, at present there are 100 representatives, half of whom are chosen by employers and the other half by trade unions.

The main objective of the council is to maintain industrial peace and try to prevent and settle disputes through the negotiation of agreements, Seifsa says.

Should negotiations reach a stage of deadlock, any of the employer or trade union parties to the industrial council are able to declare a dispute.

The industry's dispute resolution procedure, which is detailed in the main agreement, provides for the resolution of industry-level and company-level disputes in a formalized structure.

The industry-level dispute resolution procedures involve initial meetings of the parties leading up to third party intervention type processes, such as mediation, arbitration or industrial court determination and legalized industrial action, such as strikes and lock-outs.

The group metal industries embrace more than 9,000 firms employing 362,000 people.

This workforce represents more than a third of the total manpower engaged in all manufacturing activity in South Africa.

Seifsa, formed in 1943, is made up of 49 independent industry-based associations which in turn have 3,200 engineering companies as their members.

These companies employ more than 70 percent of the industry's total workforce covered by the main agreement.

Twelve metal industry trade unions represent a total of 273,203 members.

Last year the agreement provided for wage and bonus increases ranging from 15.5 percent at artisan level to 18.8 percent at the lower skilled level.

The settlement also included a range of improvements to specific conditions of employment, one of which was a reduction in the working week.

With effect from October 1, 1990, the industry's standard 45-hour work week was reduced to 44 hours with no change to hourly wage rates of employees.

There have been consistent efforts to narrow the differential earnings gap between unskilled and skilled workers in the metal industry.

For instance, in 1961, the prescribed minimum hourly rates of pay for Rate A (the top category) and Rate I (the lowest category) were respectively 50 cents and 10 cents (5:1). The ratio now stands at 2.2:1 with Rate A and Rate H employees earning R [rands] 9.50 and R4.18 respectively.

At a pre-negotiation conference held in January 1991 between Seifsa and the trade unions, the parties sought ways to expedite the negotiation process in an attempt to bring the process to a conclusion, either by reaching agreement or deadlock before the expiry of the main agreement in June. Accordingly the trade unions agreed to distinguish between "core demands" and "other demands" and to limit their core demands to no more than six proposals a union. The timetable for negotiation meetings is April 11, April 23 and May 21.

Angola**Luanda: Peace Accord May Be Signed 2, 3 May***MB3004125291 Luanda Domestic Service
in Portuguese 1200 GMT 30 Apr 91*

[Report from Lisbon correspondent Andeiro Joao]

[Text] The Angolan cease-fire accord documents could be informally signed in the next 72 hours. This rules out the possibility of the signing ceremony taking place at the Bicesse hotel school today.

This morning sources said that jurists of the Angolan Government and UNITA delegations, and the staff [preceding word in English] of the Portuguese mediators are still drafting the final documents, which still need to go through a second reading. There are four documents—namely, the Washington accord, the accord on the fundamental principles for establishing peace in Angola, the cease-fire accord, and the Estoril protocol.

Basically, the first three documents deal with the principles outlined in the documents which were due to be signed at the aborted sixth round of talks in February. The fourth document, the Estoril protocol, deals with the documents agreed upon at the Estoril peace conference, notably the guarantee and security clauses to be adhered to during the transition period. The latter protocol comes into effect between the cease-fire declaration and the holding of elections.

The Estoril protocol also defines the responsibilities and duties of the joint political and military commission and deals with the organs responsible for the monitoring of the cease-fire, as well as issues related to the disarmament and deployment of forces and the establishment of the national armed forces. The latter ought to be established by the time general elections are held.

The sources added that the question of an election date has been overcome. Some quarters believe that Angolan elections will be held between 1 September and 30 October 1992, whereas other quarters say that elections will take place between 1 September and 30 November 1992. The election day will be fixed at the end of a series of meetings with parties which will contest the elections.

So, everything is ready for Lopo do Nascimento and Jeremias Chitunda to sign the accords that have been negotiated since 4 April. No details have been given, however, concerning the place and date where the documents will be signed. Nothing has been said about Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva being present at the signing ceremony. Because tomorrow is a public holiday in Portugal, it is unlikely that the accords will be signed on that day. So, one is left with Thursday [2 May] and Friday to take the first steps toward establishing peace in Angola.

Savimbi on 'Technical Delay' in Peace Talks*MB3004160591 London BBC World Service
in English 1335 GMT 30 Apr 91*

[From the "News Hour" program; interview with UNITA President Jonas Savimbi by BBC correspondent Tim Cabral in London on 30 April—recorded]

[Text] In the Portuguese capital, Lisbon, there has been some surprise expressed by delegates to the Angolan peace talks following the assertion from the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, that peace is just around the corner. The talks are aimed at resolving the 16-year-old civil war in Angola, and Mr. Savimbi believes they have achieved just that.

Yesterday he said that both the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party government and the UNITA rebels were about to sign an agreement which would lead to a cease-fire, the merging of the two rival armies, and the holding of multiparty elections by November of next year.

Today he has said there has been a technical delay in the signing, but only for a day or two. Jonas Savimbi explained to Tim Cabral what he believes has been agreed:

[Begin recording] [Savimbi] We are going to sign a document dealing with the cease-fire. We are going to sign a document dealing with the joint military and political commission. We are going to deal with a document which treats the problems of verification commission, with the problem of internal security, with elections, and the rights of the parties. I think those are the documents that we are going to rubricate.

[Cabral] A major problem surely, Dr. Savimbi, will be the integration of the armed forces. Now, how is that going to happen?

[Savimbi] That document, also, it is included in the package. We have overcome all the problems on that. We have accepted that the MPLA, they have the air force that we don't have. But it will be under the supervision of the United Nations. They have the navy that we don't have. It will be the same. But for the army, then we will give 50 percent of it. Then, with the MPLA and us, we agreed on that. The numbers is not very important. What capacity do we have to organize in 15 or 18 months, an army of 20,000 or 40,000 or 50,000?

[Cabral] Do you control a large part of the territory of Angola? The MPLA controls another part of the territory. What is going to happen with those two territories? Will they be integrated, or will they remain isolated for a while?

[Savimbi] I am happy to say that when I have read the documents just two days ago, that problem was also dealt with in a very responsible way, which means that the end is the integration of all the countries [as heard] and all

the administrations—the liberated territory and the territories controlled by the MPLA. But they have said it will not be rushing to do it. It will take the time. We don't want to consolidate more the question of liberated areas because it may give the impression of a secession [as heard], and we are not secessionists. But they have discussed the problem and we have accepted the principle that we will have only one territory and one administration, and we will go through a process of discussions with the government of Luanda in order to integrate the liberated parts into the rest of the country.

[Cabral] And when would elections take place?

[Savimbi] We have accepted the proposals made by the mediator and observers—the United States and the Soviet Union—that elections should take place within 15 or 18 months, which means September to November 1992. We gave a consideration which I think it was retained that October and November is a rainy season and September will be the better. But it is no longer an issue between us.

[Cabral] It seems a very short space of time to organize so much. Are you confident that it will happen?

[Savimbi] It will, because I think, first of all, all the Angolans are tired of war. The military people, also, they don't want to continue to fight, and also the Angolans are looking to these meetings in Portugal today as the last expression of the confidence on the Angolan leaders—can they bring peace or not? I think we feel that responsibility. That is why I think that the day when we sign a cease-fire, and I am happy to learn that President dos Santos has accepted that he will be himself leading the delegation of the MPLA to sign a cease-fire on (?13) May, the people will work very hard in order not to go back. So, it is why I am confident that 15 to 18 months will be sufficient, first of all to consolidate peace, secondly to work toward elections. [end recording]

Further on Peace Talks, Luena Offensive

MB3004165291 London BBC World Service
in English 1515 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Report on interview with UNITA President Jonas Savimbi by BBC correspondent Robin White in London; date not given—recorded; from the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] Yesterday Angola's rebel leader Jonas Savimbi announced that a peace accord will be initialed today between the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] rebels and the Angolan Government. But today Mr. Savimbi held a press conference saying the initialing wouldn't be today after all but that it would take place later this week. At this press conference he also revealed that [words indistinct] signing would take place on 30 May and that a full cease-fire would come into effect after that, which will be monitored by the United Nations. He said that elections would take place in about 15 to 18 months' time. Well, despite Mr.

Savimbi's optimism, there are some who might be skeptical about his words this time. The much-publicized agreement in Gbadolite in 1989 came to nothing and right now UNITA are fighting hammer and tongs with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] government around the town of Luena. Jonas Savimbi is in London at the moment, and Robin White asked him whether it was really peace now or more propaganda:

[Begin recording] [Savimbi] I think this time it is really peace coming because I don't think that it will fail.

[White] The MPLA seems to be a little annoyed that you have leaked so many details of this agreement.

[Savimbi] They have leaked more than (?me). The MPLA have leaked from the first day they arrived in Estoril. They have kept on sending all the messages to Luanda radio to leak all the information. We were the people who have complied with the rules. So, I am not saying anything which is not public. When I talk about a cease-fire, when I talk about the joint military political commission, it is nothing which is secret.

[White] Now, there is according to your timetable due to be a cease-fire, proper cease-fire [words indistinct] now, why can't you just stop fighting now and spare more lives?

[Savimbi] The problem is that we have learned a lesson in 1989. After Gbadolite, the MPLA, they have launched a huge offensive against our areas which took four months, and we lost 1,000 men. Now, from February of this year, the MPLA started to concentrate forces again in Luena and in Bie, and they have taken Chicala which was under control of UNITA, (Saleno), which was under the control of (?UNITA). We were forced then to give orders to our troops to make a containment operation. It is not because we want to make an offensive, because Luena is the central base of the MPLA to launch the offensive. We will be there until we sign a cease-fire but not because we want to take it.

[White] But people who die or are injured or lose their (?family) between now and six months' time, how will they feel? They will feel they have died for nothing or [words indistinct]?

[Savimbi] [Words indistinct] it is not only UNITA who is making a containment operation. The MPLA, they are launching offensives in the country and they are killing women and children and everybody. This is war, and I think you cannot humanize the war. What you need to do is to (?finalize it) [words indistinct].

[White] When will cease-fire date come? Have you agreed on a line where each of you should be?

[Savimbi] Absolutely. [Words indistinct] when they say that I am leaking, those are the things I am not saying, because I know how many places there are going to be concentrated. I am not saying that. [Words indistinct] it is because we agreed that they will be concentration

[words indistinct]. Then I will not do that [words indistinct]. That is part of the agreement.

[White] But that is what will happen on cease-fire, then [words indistinct]?

[Savimbi] Yes, I think that we agreed that people will be staying in some areas agreed upon.

[White] And you said that the new army will be split 50-50?

[Savimbi] Yes, [words indistinct] will be 50-50. UNITA will give a contribution of 50 percent for the army and the MPLA will do likewise.

[White] What about other forces in the country? What about the old FNLA [Angola National Liberation Front]? Would they have any [words indistinct]?

[Savimbi] They don't have anything. They don't have any guns. They don't have any soldiers. So, they cannot participate in that operation.

[White] Do you have a date in your mind when you will go back to Luanda, or will you [words indistinct]?

[Savimbi] I will go back to Luanda in July because the dates of June, the cease-fire will be in force, and the forces of the United Nations will be in place. So, I will move to Luanda.

[White] When it comes to the elections, do you think that people are going to split on tribal lines, or how do you think it will [words indistinct]?

[Savimbi] No. Tribalism which people are talking about is not very acute in Angola. People, they belong to their tribe—it is a fact—but they regard the national interests more important than the tribal ones. [end recording]

* Frescangol Hopes To Increase Meat Imports

91AF0905C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 3 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Miguel Filipe: "Frescangol Imported 80,000 Tons of Various Types of Meat"]

[Text] At least 80,000 tons of various types of meat has been imported since 1987 by the Perishable Products Supply Company (FRESCANGOL), using an exchange "ceiling" that ranges between \$20 million and \$30 million per year.

The company's director-general, Mario Augusto Sampaio Nunes, said that such quantities have not met the consumer needs of the country's population, particularly the population in those regions that are considered to be wanting, which are the provinces located in the northern part of Angola (Luanda, Cabinda, Bengo, Zaire, Malange, Lunda-Sul, Lunda-Norte, and Moxico, among others).

Augusto Sampaio, who was speaking in an interview granted on Tuesday [26 February] to JORNAL DE

ANGOLA in Lubango, stated that this year the company already has 9,000 tons of meat to supply to the above-mentioned provinces. That amount, which FRESCANGOL has spent \$10 million to acquire, (referring to the plan to supply meat up through next June) is considered by the director to be "skimpy."

According to its official, FRESCANGOL needs \$40 million per year to satisfy the country's meat needs. This is an amount that will make it possible to acquire 20,000 tons of meat, but it is difficult for the government to come up with such an amount in light of the country's weak economic and financial conditions.

With a total theoretical capacity to preserve and freeze 10,000 tons of meat, FRESCANGOL will soon be able to turn itself into a commercial enterprise and participate in the start-up process of the activities of the future Southern Meat Company of Angola (SOCARNES), which is to be created as a substitute for the current National Cattle Products Distributor (DINAPROPE).

The director-general of FRESCANGOL states that it is not possible at the moment to substitute the meat-importing system for the commercialization and production of cattle in the country, due to factors that he considers circumstantial. As the main ones, he mentioned the need to rehabilitate the cattle-slaughtering structures of the provinces in the southern part of the country (slaughterhouses), and the need to push the Program of Progressive Substitution of Meat Imports, which was begun in 1989 by DINAPROPE.

Augusto Sampaio stressed that these actions alone (recovery of the cattle-slaughtering structures and the encouragement of the Program of Progressive Substitution of Meat Imports) will create the conditions necessary for a slow reduction in the amounts of currency that the country is spending on the meat-importing system.

Of the countries mentioned as being the principal suppliers of meat to FRESCANGOL, France figures as the largest exporter, followed by Argentina and Brazil, among others, which the director considers to be less important.

Reportage on Savimbi Visit to West Europe

WA2904190691

For reportage on the visit by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] President Jonas Savimbi to West Europe, including reports on his talks with top officials, please see the country sections of the 29 April West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Lesotho

Ex-Finance Minister Confirms Lekhanya Overthrow

MB3004135691 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1345 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Bloemfontein April 30 SAPA—A former finance minister of Lesotho, Mr Evastius Sekhonyana, has confirmed that Major-General Metsing Lekhanya was forced to resign.

Mr Sekhonyana said in an interview with SABC [South African Broadcasting Corporation] radio news in Bloemfontein that Gen Lekhanya was told "in very strong terms" on Monday [29 April] night that he and certain cabinet ministers had to resign.

Mr Sekhonyana added, however, that he could not say who was behind the coup.

UK Calls Overthrow 'Palace Coup'

MB3004142891 Umtata Capital Radio in English
1400 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Lesotho's military ruler has been toppled in a coup. Although details of the country's new ruler are still sketchy, British Government sources say the overthrow appears to be a palace coup, saying that while the ruler and those close to him have been deposed, the only real changes to be expected are the names of those in top leadership positions.

Lesotho leader Major General Metsing Lekhanya was overthrown when troops surrounded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting this morning. Lekhanya later announced over state radio that he was resigning. People listening to the broadcast say he appeared to be talking under threat because his voice shook as he spoke. The situation in the country's capital, Maseru, is reported to be quiet.

The new rulers of the country are expected to be announced soon.

Lekhanya Said Imprisoned

MB3004144991 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1410 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Johannesburg April 30 SAPA—Former Lesotho military strongman Major-General Justin Metsin Lekhanya's fall from grace has been almost total—he has been jailed in the country's maximum security prison in Maseru along with common criminals.

A source in the tiny mountain kingdom told SAPA Gen Lekhanya was taken to the prison after he announced his resignation over Radio Lesotho.

"We saw the vehicle with Gen Lekhanya going in the direction of Lesotho's maximum security prison. The vehicles then entered the compound and I have heard he is all alone in a cell.

"I believe he is going to be charged with corruption. Although he is in his own cell, the prison houses common criminals as well," said the source, who did not want his name published for fear of retaliation.

Meanwhile, senior officers in the Royal Lesotho Defence Force were by late Tuesday [30 April] afternoon still haggling over a successor to the deposed general.

An announcement expected on Radio Lesotho at 1 PM [1100 GMT] failed to materialise.

"We were told the military men are still debating over who should run the country. It seems there is a logjam with regard to whether another general should take over or whether the new incumbent should be appointed by King Letsie III," said an employee of the radio station.

The exiled monarch, King Moshoeshoe II, is expected to respond to the coup later in the day. He is in self-seclusion in London.

Ramaeme Reportedly Successor

MB3004151991 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1512 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Johannesburg April 30 SAPA—Reports reaching South Africa have named Col Elias Phisoane Ramaeme as the successor to deposed Lesotho leader Maj-Gen Justin Letsing Lekhanya.

A South African foreign affairs official was quoted in some news reports as saying the colonel's name had been forwarded to Foreign Affairs [Ministry] later on Tuesday [30 April] afternoon.

This, however, could not be confirmed in Maseru and Johannesburg. Foreign affairs officials had left by the time the reports surfaced.

A journalist working for Radio Lesotho said the radio station had not received any reports of a successor. As far as he was aware, the new military men were still haggling over a successor to Gen Lekhanya.

The new military supremo was supposed to be announced at midday over Radio Lesotho, but journalists there still had no word on the new man.

Pretoria Confirms Ramaema Ruler

MB3004190091 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1841 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Johannesburg April 30 SAPA—The South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria has confirmed that Col Elias P. Ramaema replaced ousted strongman Maj-Gen Metsing Lekhanya as chairman of the Lesotho Military Council, effectively making him ruler of the country.

"(Ramaema) replaced Lekhanya as chairman of the Military Council," said the foreign affairs spokesman, who declined to be named.

Col Ramaema, who survived the bloodless putsch, is a former member of the council which took over from Chief Leabua Jonathan.

The foreign affairs spokesman said though the situation was confusing, he believed it was quiet and peaceful in Lesotho.

—The news of Col Ramaema's succession had not filtered through to Lesotho residents on Tuesday (30 April) night.

The leader of the constituent assembly, Col Lesole Jane, told SAPA's correspondent in Maseru that the four members of council who survived the coup would run the country until the emergence of a new leader.

Col Jane, also minister of energy and mining, was asked but could not confirm that a new leader had been appointed.

He said popular discontent within the Army had precipitated the resignation of Gen Lekhanya.

"I cannot give a detailed account of events that led to their resignation as it is purely a military issue," he added.

Col Jane reaffirmed the military's commitment to return the country to civilian rule in 1992. "The national constituent assembly will continue to function as scheduled as well as all other government programmes," he said.

Maseru Radio Confirms 'Changes'

MB3004153691 Maseru Domestic Service in Sesotho 1516 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Here is an urgent announcement to the nation of Lesotho: The military has instituted changes in the government and administration of the country. The wheels of government will continue to run smoothly without any interference. Stay calm and preserve peace and calm.

Lekhanya, Others Stripped of Posts

MB3004163091 Maseru Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The office of the Military Council has issued a statement that further to announcements made over Radio Lesotho during the day advising of changes in the government, the nation is informed that, first, the former chairman of the Military Council and Council of Ministers, Mr. Justin Metsing Lekhanya, has relinquished the position of commander of the Armed Forces and consequently is no longer holding the position of chairman of the Military Council and Council of Ministers.

Second, in addition Mr. Michael Nkhahle Tsotesti, a former member of the Military Council, is no longer a member of the Lesotho Defense Forces, and he, too, similarly is no longer a member of the Military Council.

Thirdly, Messrs. Evaristus Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana and Thomas Motsoahae Thabane no longer hold their former positions as members of the Council of Ministers.

Fourthly, the structure of government remains unchanged, and further announcements will be made as necessary.

Security, Police Reportedly Led Coup

MB3004171191 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Government sources in Lesotho's capital, Maseru, say five officers, including the head of security and the police chief, led today's coup that ended the five-year military rule of Major General Metsing Lekhanya. [passage omitted]

According to some reports the coup was not politically motivated but resulted from dissatisfaction with wages by a segment of the Armed Forces.

The latest reports from Maseru say that Gen. Lekhanya has been arrested and is in the security prison in the city. Our special representative in Maseru reports that everything is quiet in the city.

Lekhanya Discusses 'Putsch'

MB0105102091 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1001 GMT 1 May 91

[By Neil Lewis]

[Text] Johannesburg May 1 SAPA—Deposed Lesotho military strongman, Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya, on Wednesday said he hoped the putsch that toppled him on Tuesday would not stall democratic reforms in the tiny mountain kingdom.

In an interview with SAPA from his government house in Maseru West—where he was packing his belongings—the general also denied he had been placed under arrest. Instead, he was preparing to leave the mansion by May 14 en route to his smallholding outside Maseru.

Asked about his feelings on the coup and what its objectives would be, Gen Lekhanya said:

"Well, I hope the coup was not done to deviate from the belief of the Army to democratise the country. I hope it will be for the good of all the people of our country."

He said he did not think the bloodless coup would change the country's policies.

"The sergeants and warrant officers, who forced me to resign yesterday morning, did not seem to know what they wanted besides salary increases. With the coming to power of Col Elias Ramaema, things will not change—especially projects such as the Lesotho Highlands water scheme—as the new head of government was my right

hand man. He only asked to take control after I was deposed. He was not even in on the coup," said Gen Lekhanya.

He also denied he had been cast into a maximum security prison, along with common criminals.

Tracing the background leading to his overthrow, the general, who himself came to power in a coup in 1986, said he had been aware of complaints in certain sections of the Army for some time.

"On Monday, I was with some soldiers and their major complaint was that the salary increases were not enough. On Tuesday, a group of sergeants, led by one Sgt Qothelo—I don't know his first name—came to my government residence. They said they had been complaining and I was not satisfying their complaints."

He was then ordered by the contingent to accompany them to the Radio Lesotho broadcasting centre where he was ordered to make a statement on his resignation.

"After an hour there, I was then escorted back to the Royal Lesotho Defence Headquarters. I stayed there for about another hour. There were senior officers and representatives of that group.

"They said now that I had not promised them anything the previous day and I had announced my resignation to the country, I was free and could go. I was not taken to prison at all. Instead, I came back to my government residence and began packing. I have been ordered to vacate these premises by May 14 at the latest," he said. Gen Lekhanya said the coup plotters were confused.

"I have been with Col Ramaeme for a long time. He wasn't involved. When I heard the plotters speaking, I got the impression that they had no plans as to who should be in charge. They only spoke to him after I was deposed."

He did not think the exiled King Moshoeshoe II was the brains behind the putsch.

"I am not aware of his involvement, but I know he will be happy," added the general.

Namibia

* Government Maintains Reconciliation Policy

91AF0942A Paris LE MONDE in French
21 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by Frederic Fritscher]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Discontent is beginning to germinate in the peripheral areas, the old apartheid ghettos. The statistics are sketchy, but times are certainly rough. Between 30 and 50 percent of the labor force is unemployed. "We want 500 rands apiece," declares an angry slogan on the wall of a street leading to government headquarters.

The feeling that independence has brought no changes is a source of unhappiness widely shared among the least favored, who do not always understand why there has not been a "reversal" or a "redistribution of wealth." The "national reconciliation policy" followed by the government for a year has created no unity. Although it is well received in certain quarters, however, the ministers are being called to task. "Reconcile with whom?" inquire the base militants of SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization], the party in power, who believe that their "cause was just." The politicians are clearly the only ones to have recognized from the outset that it was successful.

"We have it! Democracy is firmly established in the country," agrees Mr. Dirk Mudge, president of the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance), a coalition of 11 opposition parties with 21 deputies in Parliament, compared to SWAPO's 41. Well-spoken, Deputy Mudge, like his National Assembly colleagues, prefaces remarks addressed to his adversaries with the title "honorable," even if it involves invective denouncing the latest budget, and declaring that "the government is living beyond its means."

An Example for South Africa

"National reconciliation," the order of the day during the first year of independence, has, however, produced some spectacular fruit. The government traveled to New York to the donor countries' conference and the UN General Assembly, with opposition leaders, including militants of the extreme right. "The other delegates could not believe their eyes," recalls one of the members of the Namibian "team," for whom last year was one of "change within continuity."

The Namibian constitutional process introduced the "concept of consensual politics" to the region, says one high-level official. The Constitution was unanimously adopted on 9 February 1990, with the voices of the right and the extreme right. Mr. Sam Nujoma was unanimously chosen that same day to be the first president of independent Namibia. All that has contributed to the proof that "colonized and colonizers, blacks and whites can work together," he emphasizes.

The example is essential for South Africa, where the white authorities and the African National Congress (ANC) are engaged in negotiations that will eventually result in a new constitution. Nelson Mandela's ANC and other anti-apartheid organizations such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) are calling for election of a constituent assembly and an interim government, along the Namibian model—demands that Pretoria rejects. "It is in order to bridge the gap between the two sides that we have organized a three-day seminar for 32 ANC legal experts in February," a Namibian diplomat reveals.

The changes occurring in one year are fundamental. The policy of reconciliation has committed the whites to a transfer of power and the blacks to patience. A certain trust has progressively won over the white community, the private sector and businessmen. All have observed

that they had sufficient opportunity to express themselves. The government had promised that there would be no expropriations, nationalizations, or expulsions. Up to now, it has kept its word. In a sign of the times, a white farmer has just invested 3 million rands in a facility near Grootfontein, 500 km northeast of Windhoek, to produce bananas and other tropical fruit.

As a way of encouraging potential investors, the coherence of the economic policy chosen well before independence and applied in Namibia's first budget has just been recalled, after a conference at the beginning of February. The economy is mixed, which is to say that the private sector is solely responsible for growth, while the public sector must ensure redistribution of wealth. The time has passed when SWAPO was primarily a liberation movement of Marxist tendencies. The market economy henceforth has its place guaranteed by the Constitution.

Francophilia

Considering that reconciliation is well on its way, the government wants to commit itself from now on to implementing its development program articulated around four grand axes: fishing, agriculture, construction, and education. The fishing sector is paramount: Namibian waters are among the most densely populated with fish, but also the most heavily fished in the world. Namibian officials, who have just opened negotiations with the European Economic Community, believe that revenues derived from this sector, once reorganized, could be as high as 2 billion rands four years from now.

In the agriculture sector, President Nujoma has committed to attaining self-sufficiency in food by the end of his mandate. The challenge was raised by his government, which believes the rate of demographic growth to be reasonable (the population is believed to have 1.6 million inhabitants), and he emphasizes that the amount of land planted in corn this year has doubled. On the other hand, the housing problem is disquieting. Authorities are counting, however, on "touristic interest" to catalyze construction. A Franco-Japanese hotel complex in downtown Windhoek, primarily involving the Accord group and Spie-Batignolles, and representing an investment of 200 million rands, should soon see the light of day.

French industrial corporations are well-located in Namibia. Citroen could establish an assembly plant near the border of South Africa, with its hunger for cars. The francophilia of Namibian officials originates largely among business cadres. French will be introduced as the second language in all schools, and entry-level diplomats must prove their proficiency in the language of Talleyrand.

France's firm attitude for the time being, when South Africans and the Americans are linking the possibility of Namibia's independence to the return of the Cuban troops from Angola, is a taboo subject at Windhoek. It is as a reminder of that period when Claude Cheysson was Foreign Relations Minister, that he was President Sam Nujoma's personal guest in celebrating Namibia's first year of independence.

* Geingob Discusses Foreign Aid, Economy

91AF0928A Bonn DIE WELT in German
20 Mar 91 p 8

[Interview with Prime Minister Hage Geingob by Thomas Knemeyer; place and date not given: "'Not a Pfennig Has Arrived From Germany So Far'"—first paragraph is DIE WELT introduction]

[Text] Hage Geingob, 49, today the prime minister of Namibia, fled to Botswana in 1962. Two years later, SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] leader Nujoma sent him to the United Nations. In New York, he studied pedagogy and international relations. In 1972, he was appointed to the UN Secretariat, and in 1975 he became director of the UN-Namibia Institute in Lusaka, Zambia. In 1989, Geingob returned to Namibia as the chairman of SWAPO's election committee. A year ago today, he was appointed head of the government. Geingob is considered a moderate politician who nevertheless has no electoral base of support, especially since he comes from the small Damara tribe.

[Knemeyer] The invitation to Cuban President Castro irritated not only people in Windhoek, but also potential foreign investors. Many people believe that under your government's democratic trappings beats a communist heart. Why Castro?

[Geingob] Everyone knows that without Cuban military aid we would not have been able to implement UN Resolution 435. We appreciate what Castro has done for us. Furthermore, he is a recognized figure worldwide. As far as foreign investments are concerned, we are a sovereign state. How can a person's visit influence the investment code that we have adopted in the National Assembly? In that legislation, we provided foreigners with guarantees for creating a climate for capital investments.

[Knemeyer] List the guarantees that you provide a German businessman who could invest, say, 10 million German marks [DM] in Namibia.

[Geingob] First of all, Namibia is stable, peaceful, and a multiparty democracy. Second, they can repatriate their DM10 million and their profits. That is guaranteed by a law (Protection of Foreign Investment Act). Third, if we should disagree, you can initiate legal action in our courts and moreover enlist the services of an international court of arbitration, to which we have already declared our willingness. In addition, there are incentives such as tax deferrals and a cheap work force.

[Knemeyer] What is the situation with development assistance?

[Geingob] Certain governments are morally committed to us in that regard. Many wanted to give us loans instead of gifts, which was a problem for us. Not a pfennig has arrived from Germany so far. We also would have expected more from Japan, as well as England and the United States. There are technical problems. Thus

far, around 75 million rands have arrived, primarily from the Scandinavian countries, which have a somewhat more practical approach. We had originally budgeted for 160 million. Now we are counting on 110 million.

[Knemeyer] Following independence, you introduced a policy of reconciliation. It seems to us that there is less racial tension here than in South Africa. Is it possible to simply wipe away the past?

[Geingob] We believe that our policy works. Many condemn us, saying that the status quo has remained unaltered. Others praise us for precisely that reason. If you want to create peace between two military antagonists who hated each other, you have to forget the past.

[Knemeyer] That really works?

[Geingob] OK, you must not forget, but you do have to forgive and look to the future. You cannot live in the past. I like to tell a joke about my own bodyguards: One was a "terrorist" (a SWAPO guerrilla), the other belonged to the Koevoet (the former antiterrorism unit of the South African Police). But today they both protect me together. We must preserve peace. To do so, one must pay a price. Our policy of reconciliation is this price.

[Knemeyer] If you look at the bottom line, what have been the positive developments in Namibia?

[Geingob] Our parliamentary democracy is still in its infancy, but it works. Our debates are lively. Freedom of the press is also very lively—sometimes too irresponsible for our taste, but that too is a right anchored in the constitution that is enjoyed by the people today. This also means that we in the government think twice before we do anything. We have undertaken a restructuring of the civil service, we have tried to integrate previous people with new people, which is a very delicate operation. I think that we have succeeded in this as well.

[Knemeyer] What are your greatest concerns?

[Geingob] The economy and the growing crime rate. People are streaming into the cities, especially Windhoek, but they are not finding work there. We must create wealth before we can redistribute. Poverty and unemployment generate crime. We must generate wealth in order to reduce the gap between rich and poor.

[Knemeyer] There is a shower of criticism to the effect that your government is spending too much.

[Geingob] It is true that we are spending too much. We had to take on 55,000 government employees. If we had fired them, there would have been no peace. We also had to hire new people who had previously been excluded. But that was only an additional 5 percent.

[Knemeyer] Opposition leader Mudge is afraid that Namibia will have a deficit of a billion rands by 1992, with revenues of only 2 billion. On the other hand, you must satisfy the expectations of the black majority.

[Geingob] This country has problems, but it is not poor. New mineral deposits have been discovered. At the moment, we have lower revenues because the mines pay fewer taxes. Many people simply say, "Give me the diamonds," without thinking about it. They were completely corrupted by colonialism in that they were totally dependent on others. Many of them have never learned to plan ahead.

[Knemeyer] Shortly before independence, many blacks were running around saying, "This car will be mine soon, I will get that house."

[Geingob] So? They got neither the cars nor the houses. One has to lower one's expectations. Opportunities must be created that anyone who works hard can take advantage of. Independence also means standing on one's own two feet. The people are clever; they should not be underestimated.

[Knemeyer] Is there hunger in Namibia?

[Geingob] There are regions where people are hungry. Five percent of the population has a per capital income of \$16,500 per year. In addition, there is one percent comprising the so-called new elite: members of the government, high-ranking officials. Then there is the 39 percent of urban blacks, who earn around \$700. But there are people in the rural areas who earn \$75 a year, mostly in the former native reserves. However, this does not mean that they are all starving, because they are also living from the land, after all. But it is true that there are also people in this country who go to bed hungry.

[Knemeyer] Not enough for a revolt?

[Geingob] There are people who want to capitalize on this politically. To them I say: If people revolt, they will not come first to my house, but rather to white people's houses, and they will steal from their houses, not from mine.

[Knemeyer] It is said that there is a revolt brewing within your party, SWAPO. You yourself and Foreign Minister Theo Ben-Gurirab are considered moderates, while Information Minister Hidipo Hamutenya and party chief Moses Garob are considered radicals. Can you guarantee that your government will not split in two?

[Geingob] I have been hearing these rumors for 10 years now. Hidipo Hamutenya and I have been working together for 25 years. Things are similar with Garob and me. That is utter nonsense and wishful thinking by our opponents. I am prime minister of the government; my electoral district is the entire nation. I must be careful about what I say. Moses Garob is the head of the party, and he must mobilize people. He can speak freely. But he must consult with me daily.

Ivory Coast

* Ouattara's Remaining Restructuring Priorities

91AF0940A Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Apr 1991 pp 114-117

[Article by Jean-Pierre Bejot]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] By chasing out the incompetents and the betrayers—and even in resorting to sanctions—Alassane Ouattara has restored the image of the head of state, who all too often, because of gratefulness for political services rendered, is considered the best protection against just punishment.

The road to complete health for the country's political and economic existence is still long, however. The prime minister is aware of that. He has established three priorities for the weeks to come.

Three Priorities: Security, Justice, Youth

First, there is the problem of security, which is still far from resolved. Gangsterism continues to paralyze economic and tourism activity. Certainly, there has been progress toward eliminating repression, with those responsible arrested, tried, and sentenced. But the problem is more serious and complex than it would appear. The deterioration in the country's economic and social situation has resulted in an increase in petty delinquency, too often violent, but ill-structured and badly organized. This tends to become—and the war in Liberia, by multiplying arms trafficking, has not helped matters—the catalyst for the development of a more professional gangsterism with ramifications beyond the Ivory Coast. The first measure to be effected immediately, and which was decided upon last 14 March, was the total withdrawal of all passports in circulation within a one-year period, and the issuance of new passports. OIPC (International Criminal Police Organization, better known as Interpol) President Yvon Barbot was received in mid-March by the head of government and the Interior and Security Minister. The objective of the meeting: to establish an Interpol subregional office in Abidjan, the creation of which was authorized by the Council of Ministers last 30 January.

Alassane Ouattara has told us that as of now, police prefects have been established in Abidjan and Bouake, modeled after those in Paris. As his second priority, the prime minister intends to comprehensively reform the judicial system. In effect, it serves no one to strengthen the resources of the police if the judicial structures are incapable of ensuring effective work. In addition, the judicial reform will, we have been led to believe, focus on strengthening sanctions against crime through a variety of measures facilitating the fight against what is known in the West as white-collar crime. This essentially involves punishing diversions of funds, dishonest operators, bad check-writers, and issuers of false payments. The prime minister has not forgotten that he is also

Minister of Economics and Finance and that there is a banking sector to rehabilitate.

His third priority is youth, for whom the situation continues to deteriorate. That means professional training activities, better access to education, job creation, and improvement in the cultural and social situation. The measures to be taken are already being studied. They should be rapidly defined, evaluated, and presented to the head of state. Alassane Ouattara also wants to move fast here. And, above all, to integrate these measures into the 1991 budget, which has not yet been adopted but should be in the coming weeks. Then, he tells us, he will have to rely on his medium-term economic policy program for three to four years to come, in order to reinstate negotiations with lender. And with a reduced team, it is necessary for him to be present on all fronts. Included in the economic policy is the important program to privatize public enterprises, which should be carried to term.

With the exception of the EECI [Ivory Coast Electric Power Company], in the energy sector, none of the other Ivorian economy's dinosaurs have yet been the target of a real restructuring.

A decision on the ONT, the National Telecommunications Office, is imminent, however. The technical study committee's conclusions were due on the prime minister's desk on 26 March to allow the restructuring operation to begin by 2 April.

As with the EECI, there is a tendency toward a double structure: a public establishment, on one side, responsible for assets; and on the other side a mixed enterprise, Ivory Coast Telecom (Citelcom), owned by the government (97 to 98 percent) and ONT officials (2 to 3 percent), to develop domestic and international telecommunications. A one-year transition period is anticipated before actually privatizing Citelcom.

On this issue the Ivory Coast (and more specifically the Committee for the Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises) wanted to show originality at all cost. The great idea promoted here is effectively to divide each existing state-owned enterprise into a state-owned asset management company and a private or mixed enterprise responsible for operations.

This is an intellectual distinction capable of convincing only intellectuals. Not the professionals in the sector.

In any case, the privatization dossier has suffered delays as a result of the full political calendar from the end of 1990.

Another burden while awaiting the decision: the Stabilization Fund. The policy of purely and simply suppressing that fund, which was supported by the authorities in Washington, appears to have been discarded since the government opted for a "Cameroonian" policy, i.e., a stabilization system around the following objectives: maximization of revenue from the country's

exports and production potential; reduced outlays by the Stabilization Fund; and protection of farmers through adequate support prices, given the external markets.

The discipline that Alassane Ouattara called for several months ago has come to be well-known by Ivorian "elites" for its burden. The population, meanwhile, remains restless. The administration's guiding principles only concern it from afar. What it wants are cheaper rent, jobs, and free health care.

But in the Ivory Coast, the road leading from the shacks of Treichville to the villas of La Riviera is increasingly long and difficult. It is so for everyone, though! And that is to be expected.

Liberia

Taylor Meets ECOMOG Chief, Denies Complicity

AB2904115291 Lagos International Service
in English 1030 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] General Rufus Kupolati, the field commander of the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] monitoring group [ECOMOG] in Liberia, has said that ECOMOG was set up as a completely neutral force seeking peace and tranquility in Liberia. He stated this in Kakata, 40 miles to Monrovia, when he paid a visit to Mr. Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The field commander said that ECOMOG was not in Liberia to guarantee the security of a particular individual or groups of people.

In response, Mr. Taylor, however, denied his forces' involvement in Sierra Leone's crisis. Gen. Kupolati was accompanied on the trip by Mr. Jerry Ken, the United Nations representative.

NPFL Elected National Assembly 'Speaker'

AB2804230391 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English
0900 GMT 27 Apr 91

[Text] The National Patriotic Front of Liberia, NPFL, has been elected as speaker of the Interim Legislative Assembly, the ILA, while Mr. (Bill Flakfunian) of Bong County has been elected as deputy speaker.

Nominating the speaker yesterday in the joint session of the National Legislature, Lofa County representative, Dr. (Wollo Koli), said the decision to nominate the NPFL was done in the hope of peace and reconciliation in the country. The nomination was later endorsed by the Assembly and the NPFL was elected with a vote of 24 against 6 for the INPFL [Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia].

In a brief remark, the deputy speaker thanked the Assembly for his election to one of the highest positions in the Assembly and promised to bring credit to the honorable legislators.

President Asks NPFL To Lay Down Weapons

AB3004130491 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English
0900 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] A special appeal has been made to NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] special commandos, including Isaac Musa, (Ken Lapor), (Por Vey), (Olo Vavani), and Commander (Zoway) to lay down their weapons and join the interim government to live together as one people. The appeal was made yesterday by the Liberian leader in Monrovia. He reechoed the appeal of the INPFL [Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia] and the AFL [Armed Forces of Liberia] for peace. The president also sent out a special appeal to all NPFL commandos, all youngsters bearing arms, and those manning ambush positions on the various highways around the country to lay down their weapons. The Liberian leader invited the combatants to seek a productive future together.

Johnson Named Spokesman of Ex-Combatants Program

AB3004130891 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English
0900 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The leader of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, Brigadier General Prince Johnson, has been appointed as the chief spokesman and promoter of the Special Rehabilitation Program for Former Combatants. The duty of the commission will be to provide social and psychological counselling, as well as training for productive employment and job placements for former combatants. This was announced yesterday in several proposals put forward by the president, Dr. Sawyer, in a major policy speech. Gen. Johnson will hold the (?first) position for his function.

Sawyer on Refugee Situation in Sierra Leone

AB3004111291 Monrovia Radio ELBC in English
0900 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The president of the Liberian Interim Government of National Unity, Dr. Amos Sawyer, has been commenting on the refugee situation in the Sierra Leonean crisis. He says as a result of the incursion into Sierra Leone by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia [NPFL], ill-will has been engendered among Sierra Leoneans against Liberians in that country. The government will have to quickly undertake emergency measures to deal with the situation, the president said.

Through the cooperation of the West African intervention force, ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group], the Independent National Patriotic Front [INPFL] and the Armed Forces of Liberia [AFL], the president said, greater Monrovia has now become a safe haven for citizens and residents, irrespective of ethnic background or social status. He called on Liberian (?citizens) to improve their capacity for tolerance, and avoid derogatory remarks against the members of the INPFL who

have been referred to as rebels and the members of the AFL who are being referred to as remnants of Doe's soldiers.

Mali

AEEM Bureau Communique Appeals to Students

AB3004163991 Bamako Domestic Service in French
1500 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Malian Students and Pupils Association, AEEM, Coordinating Bureau communique issued in Bamako on 29 April—recorded; read by Amadou Nsanvo, second AEEM administrative secretary]

[Text] Dear comrades and honorable militants: Today, 29 April 1991, the AEEM Coordinating Bureau met with students of the Askia Mohamed High School. Following the meeting, there was a perfect understanding between the Coordinating Bureau and the students of Askia High School on the one hand and the minister of national defense on the other.

Despite an appeal for calm, we have learned with regret that the violence is continuing at certain localities in our country. Consequently, the Coordinating Bureau appeals to all Malian schools to immediately end the violence. We must understand that all this violence is orchestrated by nostalgic elements of the ousted regime.

Let us therefore not give in to provocation. All the students must keep calm, return to their schools, and take instructions only from the Coordinating Bureau. We appeal to the sense of responsibility found in all the committees of every Malian school for order and tranquility.

[Signed] The Coordinating Bureau. Dare to struggle if you want to win! The struggle continues!

Weapons Ordered Surrendered; 'Special Patrols'

AB3004171591 Bamako Domestic Service in French
1500 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Ministry of Interior and Internal Security communique issued in Bamako on 30 April]

[Text] Following the pillage of police stations, the Ministry of National Defense and Internal Security requires all persons who still have weapons of war in their possession, whatever their origin, to hand them over without delay to the nearest Gendarmerie Brigade.

Because the possession of these weapons constitutes a serious threat to social peace, the security forces, which will undertake special patrols as of 1 May, will use all legal means as of 5 May 1991 to detect, arrest, and punish anyone who still has in his possession any weapon mentioned in the present communique.

Sierra Leone

NPFL 'Spy Ring' Reportedly Broken Up in Bo

AB3004133491 Paris AFP in English 1259 GMT
30 Apr 91

[Text] Freetown, April 30 (AFP)—Sierra Leone and Guinean troops cut off and flushed out suspected Liberian rebel units in the southeast towns of Koribundu and Banjuma in weekend fighting, a Sierra Leone military communique said here Tuesday. Meanwhile, relief officials in Kenema some 200 kilometers (120 miles) east of here said rebels may have killed between 3,000 and 5,000 Sierra Leoneans and Liberian refugees in border incursions which began March 23. There has been no confirmation of casualty figures from government or other independent sources. The official said the bushes near the towns of Potoru, Segbwema and Pendembu were "littered with corpses" of young men, women and children killed by rebels.

Tuesday's military communique said that by dislodging the rebels from Koribundu and Banjuma, the rebels' intention to move west to Sumbuya on the way to the capital Freetown "has been smashed."

Koribundu lies 34 kilometers (21 miles) south of Bo, the West African country's second city and capital of the southern province. Sumbuya lies to the west of Bo, which would suggest that if the alleged rebel plan was true that the guerillas planned to bypass Bo.

Western diplomats said the 1,000-strong rebel force, which is believed to comprise an undetermined number of Sierra Leone dissidents, had announced its intention to overrun Bo last week.

The communique said the joint force also repelled advances by suspected Liberian rebels from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and "routed from Manowa" to regain a ferry which they had seized for three days.

Mr. Taylor has denied any involvement in clashes at Sierra Leone's eastern border. His troops launched Liberia's December 1989 rebellion which toppled the late president Samuel Doe.

Independent reports reaching the capital Tuesday said Banjuma Town Speaker Thomas Sowa was shot dead Sunday by rebels because he refused to serve them food. Mr. Sowa, who was crowned paramount chief by the rebels after the real paramount chief Madam Baidun Sowa fled, also refused demands to hand over young men to be conscripted into the rebel ranks. A witness said he was shot three times before falling to the ground in a pool of blood.

Military sources said Tuesday an NPFL "spy ring" had been broken up in Bo. Suspected Liberian ringleader Peter Sandie reportedly confessed to supplying rebel

commanders in the border town of Zimi with information about the Bo area for a possible attack. The sources said Mr. Sandie also implicated 12 other Liberians.

One university student captured by the rebels in Pendembu before it was retaken by the combined forces said he escaped after he was ordered to bury a number of decomposed bodies in the forest. Thousands of people have already fled the border region west to Kenema and Bo.

In response to the fighting and reports of atrocities carried out by NPFL forces, the Board of Imams of the Sierra Leone Muslim Congress, southern region, on Monday said Moslems were prepared to wage a "holy jihad by their blood and resources to defend the motherland."

In a communique sent to President Joseph Momoh and signed by 21 imams from the region, the board asked the government to allow Moslem volunteers to join the country's Armed Forces. The Moslem leaders said victory over the infidel rebels was inevitable.

Senegal

* Privatization Head on Foreign Investment, Jobs

91AF0945B Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE
in French Mar 91 p 77

[Report on interview with Abdoul Aziz Diop, minister delegate to the Presidency of the Republic in Charge of Semipublic Sector Reform; place and date not given]

[Text] Abdoul Aziz Diop, the delegate for Semipublic Sector Reform (RSP), with the rank of minister, has held this new post since October 1990. Previously, he served as coordinator of the Adjustment Program. This university professor and former Central Bank official, who is 46, is the prime mover in the policy of state disengagement set forth in 1987, but not put into effect until two years later. Abdoul Aziz Diop assessed the status of privatization in Senegal for JAE [JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE].

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] How do you proceed to transfer a public enterprise to the private sector?

[Diop] Open and aboveboard dealings are the keynote in the RSP department. First of all, we undertake a feasibility study to see if there is a reason for transfer to the private sector. Then we turn to auditors who evaluate the company assets. It is on this basis that negotiations with those who will take over a company begin. Then we issue an appeal for bids, which will be publicly analyzed by the commission on the withdrawal of the state appointed by the president of the republic. The rule is to allocate the bid to the highest bidder, but with priority for Senegalese nationals. When it comes to major investments, we encourage the establishment of joint-venture companies with foreign operators.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] In view of the low level of domestic savings, isn't there a danger that national assets will be transferred into the hands of foreign investors?

[Diop] It is true that the level of domestic savings is relatively low, and that this is aggravated by the difficulties the banking sector is encountering in its role as a financial intermediary. To avoid the risk of which you speak, we have developed tools enabling Senegalese nationals to obtain access to the capital of the companies put up for sale. It was in this way that the employees of the Sidec [Senegalese Cinema Import, Distribution, and Operating Company], which owns moving picture theaters and is engaged in film distribution in Senegal, were encouraged to buy the enterprise through the creation of economic interest groups (GIE).

We have also allowed Senegalese companies with claims on the state in connection with the equipment budget allocations (PBE), a kind of compulsory loan, to make use of these documents to buy stock in the enterprises to be transferred to the private sector. In such cases, the highest bidders are the purchasing parties, but we help them by sponsoring special incentive actions.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] Do the products of the sales of privatized enterprises make it possible to amortize the debts that led to them?

[Diop] The goal is not to make money by means of transfers to the private sector, but to stop losing it. That having been said, it is not a question of blindly selling short. It is a question of making transfers under the most profitable market conditions. Since the adjustment program was implemented, a flexible plan has been drafted to provide means of repaying debts. In order for a project to obtain approval, for example, its rate of internal profitability must be at least 13 percent. Then, the use of the resources is rationalized.

[JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE] What plans do you have for the employees who are dismissed?

[Diop] In Senegal, we have not linked privatization with dismissals. We do not believe that creating a healthy situation by reducing personnel is a prerequisite for making transfers to the private sector. Quite the contrary. In the majority of cases, we have succeeded in limiting personnel reductions. Even better, at Dakar Marine, for example, not only has the new enterprise taken over all of the previous employees, but it has also created new jobs as well. That having been said, the dismissal of employees for reorganization reasons has been allowed. To deal with this, an office of integration and reintegration has been established.

The goal is not to make money.

* Progress on Privatization Campaign Noted

91AF0945A Paris *JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE*
in French Mar 91 pp 76-78

[Article by Mamadou Alpha Barry: "Senegalese State Disengages From Business Sector"; enterprises are identified where possible]

[Text] As is the case in the overwhelming majority of the African countries, the public sector plays a preponderant role in the Senegalese economy. In fact, just after independence was won, the state had to abandon its traditional field of action to remedy the problematical lack of domestic entrepreneurs, thus taking an active part in direct productive activities.

The public sector grew rapidly, because the state wanted to extend its control over the subsoil resources regarded as strategic, the economic and social infrastructures, and the public services. It also made an effort to promote production in the hope of creating jobs, combating unemployment, and giving impetus to a growth dynamic. It pursued this course so well, and to such an extent, that at the end of a quarter of a century of interventionist policy, the state is to be found in all sectors of activity.

The semipublic sector, including all of the enterprises placed under state sponsorship, which had become overlarge and inefficient, placed a heavy burden on the financial resources of the state, thus aggravating the national budget deficit. As of the beginning of the 1980's, the Senegalese authorities decided to attack this thorny problem.

A first series of measures launched in July of 1987 brought about major changes in the relations between the state and the semipublic enterprises, giving the latter greater autonomy. As of the month of August 1989, the "new policy of the state toward the semipublic sector" was established. It has two aspects—disengagement and recovery.

Disengagement involves "refocusing the resources on the traditional and basic tasks of the state (health, education, defense, and security), so as to free the operational area for other agents, whose motivation comes closer to the rules of market economy operation," Abdoul Aziz Diop, the minister delegate to the Presidency of the Republic in Charge of Semipublic Sector Reform (RSP), explains. This simply means withdrawal from market activities in order to entrust them to private operators. This retreat by the state may be partial or total. Its most complete form involves transfer to the private sector, which means the final surrender of assets to private companies.

Recovery, for its part, pertains to the enterprises that remain within the state portfolio. The goal is to reestablish healthy public finances by redefining the relations between the state and its enterprises. This is done by

means of contract-plans, detached-service warrants, and, when necessary, rehabilitation programs.

At the time the "new policy of the state for the semipublic sector" went into effect in 1989, Senegal had 85 enterprises of this type, with capital totaling 166 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, 57 mixed-economy companies (29 percent of the portfolio), 20 public establishments (6 percent), and eight domestic companies (65 percent).

These businesses required an overall investment of 26 billion CFA francs, the equivalent of 23 percent of all the cumulative investments, with a total of 29,600 persons employed, representing 28 percent of the jobs in the modern sector. Despite its size, the semipublic sector provided only 7.4 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In addition, it swallowed up 22 billion CFA francs in subsidies, contributing greatly to the overall budget impasse that plunged to an unfathomable depth—54 billion CFA francs in 1989-90. Transfers to semipublic enterprises with no counterpart thus accounted for 40.5 percent of the total deficit and 8.4 percent of the current budgetary expenditures.

Despite the numerous recovery efforts made throughout the 1980's, the deficit continued to grow, thus hindering achievement of the goal of rebalancing public finances.

The "new policy" put into operation beginning in 1989 is organized around the following principle: the state should remove itself "when it is demonstrated that a service or a product can be obtained by another method at a lower social cost, or when for a given social cost, a greater service or product or one of better quality can be obtained as a result of this withdrawal." This is how the government statement reads. This principle has made it possible to identify the "hard core" of enterprises that should be retained in the semipublic sector "because they carry out their public service mission efficiently or play a strategic role in the development of the economy." In addition, the Senegalese authorities made it a guideline of their policy to avoid retaining firms suitable for transfer to the private sector at any cost, while also refraining from selling them off cheap.

The withdrawal of the state may take different forms—the merging of enterprises, the partial or total transfer of stocks held by the state, the reduction of units which have achieved their goals, or their conversion into public services.

In an initial stage, the feasibility study on the withdrawal of the state will deal with enterprises that have no "public-service mission," that is to say those engaged in commercial production, and in particular those that are already suffering from effective competition from the private sector. Those that show heavy deficits, exclusive of subsidies, will be very simply liquidated. In a second stage, plans call for dealing with enterprises with a public-service mission serving only a small category of clients. A closer analysis will then make it possible to

establish if this mission justifies the cost, or if it could be carried out by the private sector.

But in the short run, even before the strategy is refined, a first group of 38 enterprises, which appear to require immediate transfer to the private sector, has been identified. At the present time, 10 companies have been sold in their entirety. They are Renault Senegal, SPT [Senegalese Advertising and Tourism Company], Vacap [hotel industry], the Mbaou Poultry Farm, Seras [Livestock Development Company of Senegal], Senotel, Sipoa, Soned, Senprim, and two cinemas. The files on five enterprises have just been completed, following the working visit paid to France at the beginning of January by Minister Delegate to the presidency of the Republic in charge of RSP, Abdoul Aziz Diop. They are the SNSSS, the Mboro Fruit Project, Teranga, Meridien, and Hamo. In addition, six companies are in the process of being transferred to the private sector. They are Sodemhe, Dakar Marine, Bicis [International Bank of Commerce and Industry of Senegal], CNCAS [National Agricultural Credit Fund], Sicap, and Asace [Senegalese Foreign Trade Insurance Agency]. Finally, five enterprises were liquidated, pure and simple. They are Iransen, Sisac, SNPC, SGHV, and the SINAES [Industrial Company for Solar Energy Applications]. One firm, Seib, which was to be liquidated, was absorbed by the SON-ACOS [National Oil Products Marketing Company of Senegal]. All in all, out of a portfolio of 166 billion CFA francs, the capital to be transferred to the private sector comes to only 19 billion. The Senegalese Advertising and Tourism Company (SPT) served as a model for the privatization process. Established in 1974, it operates one of the largest travel agencies in Senegal and manages the advertising for the leading media agents, as well as an advertising design and consulting workshop. Of its capital total of 113 million CFA francs, 13 percent was directly held by the state, 60 percent by various semipublic companies, and 27 percent by Havas Afrique.

A poll on the privatization process revealed that the private businesses taking over enterprises did not want to purchase the 13 percent held by the state if the other public stockholders continued to control a majority of the capital. The professionals did not want to buy back the whole of any company—only the activities related to their own specialty. In addition, the competing advertising agencies wanted guarantees that the contracts in effect in the system would remain valid to their expiration dates.

To overcome these reasons for hesitation, the RSP office was able to arrange that the state would withdraw at the same time as the other semipublic companies holding stocks. After a lengthy search, investors prepared to take over the SPT as it was, without dividing it up, were found. As a precautionary measure, plans called for making an effort to transfer the assets themselves if the appeal for bids to purchase the stocks were to fail. But at the conclusion of the bidding period on 30 June 1989, domestic professional firms took over the business.

In the special case of the banks, the state is not attempting to withdraw totally, but rather to limit its control by reducing its share of the capital. Thus the public authority has decided to hold no more than 25 percent of the bank portfolios in the future.

When it comes to very large investments, it is difficult to foresee disengagement through a transfer of assets, given the current financial market situation. Since there is, nonetheless, a desire to preserve the public nature of the Senegalese patrimony, while at the same time having recourse to private methods of management, two companies have been created, one a patrimonial company, which is public, and another which is an entirely private operational company. "This has made it possible to halt the losses and to benefit from the gains in productivity which go along with private management," Abdoul Aziz Diop says.

It is this type of process that was applied with regard to Dakar Marine, a unit of international dimensions within the autonomous port, which is engaged in the repair of large-capacity vessels. There will thus be a public Dakar marine company and also private companies, the most important of which will be Sud Marine Senegal, an affiliate of the Sud Marine company in Marseilles.

"Managing less, but managing better." This is the slogan for the "new policy" of the Senegalese public authorities. It is a policy characterized by realism, because it has been seen everywhere that the state does not know how to make enterprises profitable. The disengagement of the public authority will lead to increased efficiency in the management of resources, the indispensable prerequisite for economic recovery. On a parallel basis, the private operators are to become more involved in order to improve the competitive capacity of the enterprises.

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